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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring 
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit  www.the-monitor.org or 
email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental 
footprint of reports by publishing all our research reports online. This report is available 
online. 
Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing 
mined areas, and assisting affected communities.
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation 
by all, including:
  No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by 
any actor under any circumstances;
  Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
  More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW);
  Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.







LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.
Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines 
are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers 
the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict 
against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason 
fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive 
items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used 
during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. 
ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, 
but not mines.
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons 
can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and 
surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their 
daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom 
of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking 
in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. 
When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending 
to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather 
than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human 
suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to sustainable development and post-conflict 
reconstruction.
ii 
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel 
mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their 
jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so 
must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families 
and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine 
incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments 
to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely 
without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded 
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines 
or ERW presence for decades to come.
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and 
internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of 
working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International 
(now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory 
Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These 
founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they 
were working within Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines 
hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized 
that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and 
that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience 
of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors 
they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and 
medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who 
spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty 
banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine 
problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them 
to be effective advocates in their respective countries.
Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage 
their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today 
there are campaigns in some 100 countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. 
It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty 
became a reality.
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days 
of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel 






mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join 
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the 
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, 
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries 
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state 
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on 
all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective 
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
The ICBL’s efforts to ban landmines have led to a whole new approach called 
humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society campaigns and has led to 
four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become 
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and 
the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States 
Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response 
to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). 
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first 
time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor 
humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. 
In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the 
CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster 
munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based 
verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research 
Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces 
and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.
The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an 
attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken 
on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive 
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases 
it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is does not send researchers into harm’s way 
and does not include hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international 
treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial 
elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. 
The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and 
evaluation.
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The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-
related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster 
munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about 
issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and an annual 
report. A network of more than two-dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered 
information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning 
coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and 
research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is 
limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that 
is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections 
from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 21st annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster 
Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2019 provides 
a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries 
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
As well as a twenty-year review, this report focuses on mine ban policy, use, production, 
trade, and stockpiling, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, 
casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action for calendar year 2018, with 
information included up to November 2019 when possible.







A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It 
was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support 
of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.
org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. 
We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international 
organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential 
information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for all their crucial assistance.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and 
Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised 
of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s 
members include: DanChurchAid (Dennis Solberg Kjeldsen), Danish Demining Group 
(Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma 
Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty 
and victim assistance team coordinator), Morgan McKenna (Monitor program manager), 
and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC Director). From January to October 
2019, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and 
produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2019. The Editorial Team included:
  Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham, 
Jacqulyn Kantack, and Keenan Danehey;
   Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Ruth Bottomley and Marion 
Loddo; and,
   Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Jennifer Reeves, Farzana 
Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore, Marianne 
Schulze, and Clémentine Tavernier.
Final editing was provided by Morgan McKenna in October and November 2019 with 
assistance from Sarah Milne (publications consultant).
Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Magnolia Design AS printed 
the report in Norway. This report was also published digitally www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
  Government of Australia
  Government of Austria
  Government of Belgium
  Government of Canada
  Government of Germany
  Government of Luxembourg
   Government of New Zealand
  Government of Norway
  Government of Sweden
  Government of Switzerland
  Government of the United States of America**
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, 
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the 
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating 
organizations.
* List accurate as of November 2019. 
** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AXO abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC battle area clearance
CCW 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA confirmed hazardous area
CMC Cluster Munition Coalition
DPO disabled persons’ organization
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERW explosive remnants of war
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU Implementation Support Unit
NGO non-governmental organization
NSAG non-state armed group
SHA suspected hazardous area
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
























Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used 
during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is 
included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty 
through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and 
ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level 
of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment 
of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means 
a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or 
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means 
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine 
designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected 
hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates 
that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine 
clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine 
clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining 
equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected 
hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed 
not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous 
areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through 
direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all 
specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is 
a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions 
each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” 
Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground 
or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. 
Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
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Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination 
has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, 
including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering 
safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device 
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine 
Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not. 
Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – 
An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety 
and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some 
cases, defining international requirements and specifications.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and 
remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-
technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, 
normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action 
centers also implement mine action activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines 
and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public 
information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.
Non-state armed groups (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed 
groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a 
broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy 
forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use 
of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding 
environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW 
contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization 
and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey 
activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from 
central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected 
area. 
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW 
contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous 
area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk 
remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 






















Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition 
(cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” 
although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.” 
Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, 
submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/
ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may 
include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface 
search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as 
intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that 
were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate. 
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her 
family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and 
needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public 
policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their 
families, and communities in society.
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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Table Key
States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of  
1 November 2019
Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of  
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The resounding success of the campaign to ban landmines has led to an entirely new 
approach called humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society and has 
led to four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.
Landmine Monitor 2019, a twenty-year review and the 21st annual edition, continues to 
monitor the inexorable progress toward a mine-free world. The stigma against landmines 
remains strong. Despite no states joining in the reporting period, 164 countries are bound 
by and are dutifully implementing the treaty’s provisions, with most of the 33 countries that 
remain outside of the treaty abiding nonetheless by its key provisions. 
Only a small number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) use the banned weapon, often 
in the form of improvised mines. These have again resulted in a high number of casualties 
in 2018, with the majority of victims being civilians, more than half of whom were children. 
As countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land, the Monitor identifies much 
that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their 
communities. Countries both within and without the regime are contributing significant 
resources toward mine clearance and other mine action activities, affirming the impact that 
this first humanitarian disarmament treaty continues to have after more than two decades.
TREATY STATUS
There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; the Marshall Islands is the last signatory 
that has yet to ratify.
  The most recent countries to join the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine 
in December 2017.
USE
From mid-2018 through October 2019, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of 
antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party 
to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
2 
NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period: 
Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen.
  There were as yet unconfirmed allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs 
in Cameroon, Colombia, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Somalia, and Tunisia.
CASUALTIES
2018 was the fourth year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of recorded casualties 
due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)—including improvised types that 
act as antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and 
other ERW. 
  In 2018, the Monitor recorded 6,897 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW—
3,059 people were killed, 3,837 people were injured, and for one casualty the survival 
status was unknown. 
  The continuing high total was influenced by casualties recorded in countries facing 
armed conflict and large-scale violence, particularly Afghanistan, Mali, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine. Accurate data gathering for active conflicts, however, 
remains challenging. 
  Although the 2018 total was less than those of the three previous years, it was still 
almost double the lowest determined annual number of 3,457 casualties in 2013. 
  For the third consecutive year, in 2018, the highest number of annual casualties was 
caused by improvised mines (3,789). This was also the year with the most improvised 
mine casualties recorded to date.
Casualties in 2018 were identified in 50 states and other areas, of which 32 are States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and in three other areas.
  The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (71%) where 
their status was known, a slight decrease in the ratio over recent years.
  In 2018, children accounted for 54% of all civilian casualties where the age was 
known, an increase of seven percentage points from the 2017 annual total, and 12 
percentage points in 2016.
  As in previous years, in 2018, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was 
known were boys (84%).
  The Monitor has recorded more than 130,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global 
tracking began in 1999, including some 90,000 survivors.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$699.5 million in combined 
international and national support for mine action in 2018, a decrease of $95.1 million 
(12%) compared to 2017. 
  This represents the second-highest combined total of international and national 
mine action funding ever reported in Monitor data, going back to 1996.
In 2018, international donors contributed $642.6 million to mine action in 43 states and 
three other areas, a decrease of $53.7 million (8%) compared with 2017. 
  This puts an end to the two years of sustained growth observed in 2016 and 2017, 
while still representing the second-highest level of international support ever 
recorded by the Monitor. 
  The top five mine action donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Germany—contributed 71% of all international 
funding, with a combined total of $458.1 million.
  Mine action in five states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia, and Lao PDR—received 











  International support for victim assistance in 17 countries as well as global activities 
totaled $44.7 million in 2018, compared to $27.7 million in 2017. 
  Although this represents an increase in volume of $17 million (61%), as a 
proportion of all international support provided it remains near the upper end 
of the 4–7% range observed since 2013.
  Half of all dedicated victim assistance went to just four countries: Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria; while a continuous decline was recorded for 
most of the other recipients (nine out of the 17 recipients of victim assistance 
funding received less support in 2018 compared to 2017).
  Donor support explicitly dedicated to victim assistance remains difficult to track 
and improved reporting on the allocation of international support by donors 
was still needed.
The Monitor identified only eight affected states that reported providing $56.9 million 




   
 
  No State Party completed clearance in 2018.
  Six States Parties that have already declared Article 5 completion or declared no 
contamination under their jurisdiction or control, currently have or are suspected to 
have residual contamination. Algeria and Burundi declared residual contamination 
and destroyed mines found within the year and are therefore in compliance with the 
Mine Ban Treaty. Djibouti, Kuwait, Moldova, and Namibia are all suspected of having 
contamination but have not made formal declarations.
  In 2018, new use of antipersonnel mines was reported in States Parties Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, and Yemen.
  Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by ICBL-CMC as more 100km²) 
is believed to exist in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. One state not party, 
Azerbaijan, and one other area, Western Sahara, are also believed to have extensive 
contamination.
At least 140km² of land was reported clear of landmines in 2018, a decrease from the 
estimated 195km² cleared in 2017.
  Over the past five years (2014–2018), total clearance of landmines among States 
Parties is estimated to be about 800km², with at least 661,491 landmines destroyed.
  The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2018 was achieved in Croatia, followed 
by Cambodia and Afghanistan, which together accounted for more than 80% of 
recorded clearance. Over the last five years, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq 
have cleared more than 83% of all land cleared by States Parties combined.
  In 2018, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all continued landmine clearance despite 
ongoing conflict or insecurity.
  In the last five years, States Parties have used non-technical and technical survey 
to release significant amounts of land, thus greatly decreasing their estimate of 
remaining contamination. Angola and Croatia have both released as much as 90% 
of previously suspected land. Cambodia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Zimbabwe have also used survey effectively to release suspected hazardous areas.
Fifty-nine states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 
2019. There has been no change from 2018.
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  Yemen (current deadline 2023) and BiH (current deadline March 2021) have both 
requested interim extensions to enable them to better define their remaining 
contamination. It is expected that both will submit further extension requests in 
March 2022 and March 2020 respectively.
  Six countries requested extensions to their Article 5 obligations in 2019: Argentina, 
Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.
  Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 1 February 
2020, but has yet to submit an extension request, and has not submitted an Article 
7 transparency report since 2014.




In 2018–2019, despite ongoing efforts, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with 
significant numbers of mine victims lacked suitable resources and practices to fulfill the 
commitments they have made in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate 
to 33 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims. The needs for assisting victims 
remain great, including in the newest States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka.
  In most States Parties, some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health 
and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken. 
  Nevertheless, following reductions in resources in recent years, many countries saw 
near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/ERW victims. 
Survivor networks also struggled to maintain their operations as they faced 
decreased resources. 
  Services remained largely centralized, preventing many mine/ERW survivors who 
live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. Shortages of raw 
materials and financial resources were an obstacle to improvements in the physical 
rehabilitation sector in several countries. 
  Only 14 of the 33 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in 
place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance.
  Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, 
and survivors’ representatives participated in 18 of the coordinating processes 
among those 21 States Parties. State initiatives for capacity-building toward 
increased participation of mine victims were almost never reported.
  Significant gaps remain in access to employment, training, and other income-
generation support activities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for 
livelihoods were most needed.
           
           
            
  
              
                
 
              
                
 
      
            
            
       
            
            
       
 Thir ty-one States Par ties, one state not par ty, and one other area have completed 
clearance of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force 
in 1999.
Over the past five years (2014–2018), six States Par ties have declared themselves
mine-free: Algeria in 2017; Burundi in 2014; Mauritania in 2017; Montenegro in
2014; Mozambique in 2017; and Jordan in 2018.
As of October 2019, 27 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5
obligations, before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines after
2025: Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028).
Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Peru are likely to 
meet their Article 5 deadline obligations. It is also feasible that Chile, Ecuador, 













States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled 
antipersonnel mines, including more than 1.4 million destroyed in 2018.
  Oman completed the destruction of its landmine stockpile in September 2018.
  Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the convention as both have missed 
successive deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.
  Three States Parties possess more than four million antipersonnel mines remaining 
to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.5 million), Greece (643,267), and Sri Lanka (77,865).
In 1999, all states collectively (both treaty signatories and non-signatories) stockpiled 
about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the global total of stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines could be less than 50 million.
PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER
Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not 
party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.
  The Monitor lists 11 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow 
future production: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. This list remains unchanged from the previous 
report.
  Those most likely to be actively producing during the past year are India, Myanmar, 
and Pakistan.
  NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen in the reporting period. 
  In 2018 and early 2019, Houthi forces in Yemen were “mass producing” landmines, 
including victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines). 
Landmine Monitor has not found evidence of state to state transfers of antipersonnel 
mines over the past 20 years. At least nine states not party to the ban have formal 
moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US.
UNGA RESOLUTION VOTING
The pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 73/61 was adopted in 
December 2018 by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, and 16 abstentions.
  This is a slight increase in votes in favor from the 2017 resolution (167) and 
maintains the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.
A core of only 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty 
resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
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Over the past 20 years, the Mine Ban Treaty has developed into an international norm 
with impressive universality. A total of 164 States Parties are implementing the treaty’s 
provisions, which prohibit antipersonnel landmines use, production, trade, or stockpiling 
and require victim assistance, clearance of mined areas within 10 years, and destruction 
of stockpiled mines within four years. Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the 
treaty abide nonetheless by its key provisions. The stigma against antipersonnel landmines 
remains strong.
During this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel 
mines by government forces in only one country, Myanmar, a state not party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty.
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines, particularly improvised 
mines, with a frequency and scale in recent years that is resulting in a palpable increase 
in new mine casualties and threatening progress toward the long-held goal of a landmine-
free world.1 NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during this reporting 
period, including in States Parties Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen, and states not party 
India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty 
has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities 
have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, some States Parties 
are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine 
clearance and victim assistance, as detailed in the relevant chapters of this report, or within 
the online country profiles.
1 The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition 
regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” 
to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
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Like-minded governments, United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organizations 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continue to work together with the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to address Mine Ban Treaty compliance challenges in a 
cooperative manner. The unity demonstrated by this community over the past two decades 
remains strong and focused on the treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the 
suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES
There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2018 through October 2019. However, 
Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in 
state not party Myanmar. Previously, Landmine Monitor 2018 found that government forces 
in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines, and Landmine Monitor 2017 found that government 
forces in states not party Myanmar and Syria used antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in six 
countries in the reporting period, as listed in the table.
Locations of antipersonnel mine use mid-2018–October 20192







               Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.
Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during this reporting period, any 
use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government or Russian forces participating in joint 
military operations in Syria. NSAGs likely continued to use improvised landmines to defend 
their positions against attack as in previous years, but access by independent sources to 
territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.
Landmine Monitor was also unable to document or confirm allegations of new 
antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Colombia, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Somalia, 
or Tunisia. However, in many cases, a lack of available information, or means to verify it, 
meant that it was not possible to determine if mine incidents and casualties were the result 
of new use of antipersonnel mines, due to legacy contamination of mines laid in previous 
years, or involved some other kind of explosive device.3
2 NSAGs used mines in at least eight countries in 2017–2018, nine countries in 2016–2017, 10 countries in 
2015–2016 and 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries 
in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries 
in 2007. In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, and Yemen.
3 New use resulting in casualties is confirmed to have occurred in 2017 earlier than October in Iraq 
and Syria, and was suspected earlier than October 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in 








LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has every year 
documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, known as Tatmadaw, and 
by various NSAGs in Myanmar. 
At the treaty’s Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018, the Myanmar 
government representative claimed that allegations that it had used landmines on the 
border with Bangladesh were without merit, and that joint patrols with Bangladeshi border 
patrols encountered no mines.4
However, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence stated to 
Landmine Monitor that “since the start of the civilian era, the Tatmadaw no longer use 
landmines” but qualified that by stating that in some instances landmines are still used. 
Specifically, he said, 
“In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around 
where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around 
infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages we warn them. 
If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group 
where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.”5 
Previously, in September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defence Major General Myint Nwe informed 
the Myanmar parliament that the army continues to use landmines in the internal armed conflict.6
Since mid-2018, fighting between the Tatmadaw and NSAG the Arakan Army in Rakhine 
state has intensified. The Arakan Army has regularly published photographs online of 
antipersonnel mines produced by the Ka Pa Sa, the state-owned military industries, 
including MM2, MM5, and MM6 antipersonnel mines among other seized weaponry.7 While 
these photographs do not specifically identify new landmine use, they do indicate that 
antipersonnel mines are part of the weaponry of frontline units. 
New landmine casualties in areas of conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army 
not previously known to have landmine contamination also indicate new use, by either the 
Arakan Army, the Tatmadaw, or both. In January 2018, Indian authorities blamed landmine 
casualties occurring on its border with Myanmar, in Mizoram state, on either the Tatmadaw 
or the Arakan Army, both of whom were operating in the area.8
Other claims of new mine use by government forces during the reporting period include:
  In September 2018, Tatmadaw forces allegedly emplaced antipersonnel mines near 
the villages of Zi Kahtawng and Hka La around Nam San Yang District of Waingmaw 
township and banned people from going to and from the villages.9
4 Statement of Myanmar, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2018, 
http://bit.ly/MyanmarMSP2018. “[T]he security forces of Myanmar and Bangladesh have been conducting 
coordinated patrol along the border in the west of Myanmar. Coordinated patrol has been made for 19 times 
so far since August of this year. No incidents of landmines casualty have been reported in the area. Such 
accusation without concrete evidence will not help facilitate countries to join the convention.”
5 Landmine Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, 
Ministry of Defence, in Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.
6 “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 
September 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-09-13-red.pdf. The deputy minister stated 
that the Tatmadaw used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, and power towers, and its 
outposts in military operations. The deputy minister also stated that landmines were removed when the 
military abandoned outposts, or warning signs were placed where landmines were planted and soldiers 
were not present.
7 See, Mine Free Myanmar, “Allegedly Seized Mines Displayed by Arakan Army,” 18 April 2019, 
https://burmamineban.demilitarization.net/?p=906.
8 “Man hurt in Mizoram IED blast,” The Telegraph, 18 January 2018, http://bit.ly/2MShazs.
9 “FBR: Clash Summary: Chaos Reigned in Northern Shan State in September,” Free Burma Rangers, 15 
October 2018.
10 
  In August 2018, in Muse District, northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw allegedly 
warned the population of Kawng Sahti that they had laid mines around Dung Aw 
and Uraw Hkyet.10
  In July 2018, in Waingmaw township of Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA) alleged that the Tatmadaw was emplacing antipersonnel mines along the Nam 
Sang River and antivehicle mines on the Zi Kahtawng road.11
Frequently it is difficult to ascribe specific responsibility for an incident to a particular 
combatant group. In August 2019, in northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed 
conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in 
Kutkai township. Subsequently, a Maw Harn villager was injured by a landmine. The villagers 
said there had been no landmines in the area prior to the conflict, but do not know whether 
government forces, NSAGs, or both, were responsible.12 In September 2019, near Nama Dar 
village in Paletwa township of Chin state, two villagers were injured by a landmine following 
armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army at that spot. The villagers were 
unsure which entity laid the mine.13
In June 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar reported, 
following their investigations into mine use allegations in September 2017, that it had
“reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, 
both in the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the 
‘clearance operations’ with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or 
killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that new 
antipersonnel mines were placed in border areas as part of a deliberate and 
planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from attempting to return to 
Myanmar.”14
In June 2018, the 20th Battalion of the KIA shared photographs with Landmine Monitor 
that it said showed mines that its forces cleared from the villages of Gauri Bum, Man Htu 
Bum, and Uloi Bai in Danai township. The photographs show around 80 antipersonnel mines, 
all M14 and MM2 types, with markings indicating Myanmar manufacture. The KIA alleged 
that Tatmadaw forces laid these mines in April and May, when the government forces left 
villages after occupying them. The KIA stated that two of their soldiers were injured while 
clearing the mines.15
Landmine Monitor subsequently showed the photographs to an official at the Myanmar 
Ministry of Defence in June 2018 and requested comment. The official noted that one mine 
shown in a photograph was an antivehicle mine and said that government forces do not use 
antivehicle mines against the insurgents as the NSAGs do not use vehicles. He said that the 
antipersonnel mines could be copies of Myanmar-made mines that a NSAG planted, as he 
said the Myanmar army does not leave landmines behind after an operation.16
10 “FBR: Clash Summary: Battles Continue in Northern Shan State Throughout August,” Free Burma Rangers, 
12 September 2018.
11 “FBR: Burma Army Tortures and Kills Six Female Medics, Continues Campaign Against Civilians,” Free 
Burma Rangers, 26 July 2018.
12 “Kutkai Villager ‘Seriously Injured’ by Landmine,” Burma News International, 20 September 2019, 
www.bnionline.net/en/news/kutkai-villager-seriously-injured-landmine.
13 Thein Zaw, “Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa,” Narinjara News, 9 September 2019, 
http://bit.ly/NN992019.
14 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.
int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf.
15 Thein Zaw, “Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa,” Narinjara News, 9 September 2019, 
http://bit.ly/NN992019.
16 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding 









LANDMINE USE BY NSAGS
In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by 
NSAGs in Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen.
Afghanistan
NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2018 and 2019 resulted in numerous 
casualties.17 The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, and Islamic State forces. According to the UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “anti-government” forces used victim-activated improvised mines in 
slightly decreasing numbers throughout 2018 and the first half of 2019.18
India
Maoist insurgents have made sporadic use of improvised landmines. In April 2019, an 
indigenous person was reportedly killed by an improvised pressure mine, allegedly laid 
by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M).19 In January 2018, a wild elephant was 
injured by a landmine in the Latehar district,  Jharkhand state, allegedly laid by the CPI-M.20 
Previously, in July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhatisgarh state told 
the state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable 
places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”21
Myanmar
Many NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2018 and 
early 2019, there were reports of new use by the KIA, Arakan Army, Democratic Karen 
Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), and the Karen 
National Liberation Army (KNLA).22 Frequently it is difficult to ascribe specific responsibility 
for an incident to a particular combatant group. For example, in August 2019, in northern 
Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern 
Alliance—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, 
and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in Kutkai township. Subsequently a resident of 
Maw Harn village was injured by a landmine. The villagers said there had been no landmines 
in the area prior to the conflict, but do not know which group was responsible.23
In February and March 2019, in Manli village in Namtu township of Shan state, several 
villagers were killed and injured by mines when returning to their agricultural fields after 
fighting between the Shan State Army-South and an alliance of the Ta’ang National Liberation 
Army and the Shan State Army-North.24 In April 2019, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Defence Services accused the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Shan State 
17 In June 2018, Afghanistan stated that that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) were responsible for killing approximately 171 civilians every month. Statement of Afghanistan, 
Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AfgISM18.
18 UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018,” Kabul, February 
2019, p. 24, http://bit.ly/2BMQedT; UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual 
Report 2017,” Kabul, February 2017, p. 31, bit.ly/AfgUNAMA2017; and UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict mid-year report 2018,” Kabul, July 2018, p. 5, http://bit.ly/2pgvWqA.
19 “One civilian killed in landmine blast,” Hans News Service, 1 April 2019, http://bit.ly/THNI517256.
20 “Hurt tusker hints at rebels,” The Telegraph, 15 January 2018, http://bit.ly/2pXzg9W.
21 Tikeshwar Patel, “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: police,” Press Trust of India, 24 July 
2017, http://bit.ly/2WfK8vY.
22 There are also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress 
Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA) and the Restoration Council Shan State/Shan State Army-South 
(RCSS/SSA) in their operations against Myanmar armed forces during the reporting period. 
23 “Kutkai Villager ‘Seriously Injured’ by Landmine,” Burma News International, 20 September 2019, 
www.bnionline.net/en/news/kutkai-villager-seriously-injured-landmine.
24 Myat Moe Thu, “Three killed, four injured by landmine in Shan State,” Myanmar Times, 1 April 2019, 
www.mmtimes.com/news/three-killed-four-injured-landmine-shan-state.html.
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Progressive Party (SSPP) of laying the mines that caused the injuries.25 In September 2019, 
near Nama Dar village in Paletwa township of Chin state, two villagers were injured by a 
landmine following fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army. The villagers were 
unsure which group laid the mine.26 In February 2019, near Nam Maw Lon village, in Hsipaw 
township, in northern Shan state, a villager died and two were injured after stepping on a 
mine in an area that had seen recent fighting between the Restoration Council Shan State/
Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA) and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-
North (SSPP/SSA). Both groups blamed the other side for the incident.27
Most allegations of new use were reported in Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states: 
  In July 2019, in Hpapun township of Kayin state, the KNDO laid mines in the Bu Ah 
Der village tract reportedly to defend against attack by Tatmadaw.28
  In May 2019, in Hlaingbwe township of Kayin state, a DKBA officer from Meh 
Pru village tract ordered his soldiers to plant more landmines in seven nearby 
mountainous villages to protect the area.29
  In December 2018, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization of southern Shan 
state stated that the Restoration Council Shan State/Shan State Army-South had 
frequently laid landmines in their area.30
  In August–September 2018, in Hpapun township of Kayin state, KNLA Battalion 
#102, Company #4 informed villagers that they would lay mines near former 
Tatmadaw military camps, and that they should not go to those areas. Subsequently 
two Tatmadaw soldiers reportedly were injured by these mines.31
  In November 2018, two civilians were injured in a mine incident which the KIA 
blamed on use by the TNLA.32
  In October 2018, New Mon State Party claimed that the KNU had laid landmines 
in a disputed area in Yebyu township in Thanintharyi region.33 The KNU denied the 
allegation.34
  In August 2018, near Kammamaung in Hlaingbwe township of Kayin state a KNLA 
soldier was injured by a mine he had laid.35
Nigeria
In Nigeria, the NSAG Boko Haram has used improvised landmines since mid-2014.36 In June 
2019, Nigeria reported new contamination in the northeastern part of the country.37 Previously 
25 Min Naing Soe, “Army announces TNLA and SSPP planned mine attack in Manli Village,” Eleven Myanmar, 
1 April 2019, http://bit.ly/2WgbbY6.
26 Thein Zaw, “Two villagers injured by a landmine explosion in Paletwa,” Narinjara News, 9 September 2019, 
http://bit.ly/NN992019.
27 “One Killed, Two Injured in Hsipaw Landmine Blast,” Burma News International, 20 February 2019, 
www.bnionline.net/en/news/one-killed-two-injured-hsipaw-landmine-blast.
28 Karen Human Rights Group, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2019, unpublished.
29 Ibid.
30 Nyein Nyein, “Shan Armed Group Kills At Least Four Ethnic Pa-O in Shooting,” the Irrawaddy, 12 December 
2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/shan-armed-group-kills-least-four-ethnic-pa-o-shooting.html.
31 Karen Human Rights Group, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2019, unpublished.
32 “FBR: Clash Summary: Steady Fighting in November in Northern Burma,” Free Burma Rangers, 15 December 
2018.
33 “Landmine blasts injure two in NMSP-KNU disputed-area in Yebyu Tsp within this month,” Burma News 
International, 29 October 2018, http://bit.ly/349sMnt.
34 “Three More Landmines Explode in Tanintharyi,” Burma News International, 9 January 2019, www.bnionline.
net/en/news/three-more-landmines-explode-tanintharyi.
35 “Skirmishes Between Burma Army and KNLA Increase in Northern Karen State,” Karen News, 18 September 
2018, http://bit.ly/31PMEKH.
36 See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Nigeria: Mine Ban Policy,” 2015–2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2019/nigeria/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
37 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Stockpile Destruction, 








in September 2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) issued a report detailing significant new 
use of improvised antipersonnel landmines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups on roads, 
in fields, and in villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Yobe and Adamawa states.38
In June 2019, the Nigerian Army published photographs of two pressure plate activated 
explosive devices encountered during counter insurgency activities in Borno state.39 
Previously, on 6 March 2018, four loggers were killed when they stepped on landmines 
reportedly laid by Boko Haram near Dikwa, 90 kilometers east of Maiduguri in Borno state, 
after they went to retrieve a vehicle abandoned the previous day during a Boko Haram 
attack.40 In early 2017, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported extensive use of improvised 
mines by Boko Haram in northern areas of Nigeria.41
Pakistan
NSAGs in Balochistan and Khyber Paktunkhwa used improvised antipersonnel landmines during 
the reporting period. Use is attributed to a variety of militant groups, frequently referred to 
as “miscreants” in media reports, but generally accepted to be constituent groups of the 
Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups.42 As in previous years, many 
military personnel and some civilians were killed or injured in incidents of new use, however 
from available information it is difficult to make specific attribution to the perpetrators. 
The Monitor has recorded numerous antipersonnel mine incidents in Balochistan, and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, although in some cases the precise date of mine use cannot be ascertained.
Yemen
Houthi forces in Yemen used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during 2018 and 2019, 
primarily on the west coast of the country near the port of Hodeida. Houthi forces are also 
reported to have used landmines in the past along the coast, along the border with Saudi 
Arabia, around key towns, along roads, and to cover retreats. 
A Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen convened by the UN Human Rights Council 
reported in September 2019, “The use of landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, by 
the Houthis has resulted in significant harm to civilians.” According to the report, the group 
“investigated reports of civilian casualties caused by anti-personnel and anti-
vehicle landmines allegedly emplaced by Houthi fighters in Aden, Al Hudaydah, 
Lahij and Ta’izz governorates, and examined further reports of civilian casualties 
from landmines in Abyan, al-Dhale’e, Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Hajjah, Ibb, Ma’rib, Sana’a, 
Sa’dah and Shabwah governorates. It confirmed civilian casualties from anti-
personnel landmines verified as having been emplaced by Houthi fighters in 
incidents it investigated in Aden, Al-Hudaydah, Lahij and Ta’izz governorates.”43
38 MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/
MAGNigeria2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of victims of explosive incidents 
were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and early 2018.
39 It is uncertain from available information if this device can be triggered by a person. Nigerian Army, 
“Troops thwart terrorist ambush,” Press Release, 23 June 2019, http://bit.ly/369HZql.
40 “Boko Haram terror continues, 10 killed in fresh attacks,” Telangana Today (AFP), 7 March 2018, 
https://telanganatoday.com/boko-haram-kills-nigerian-attacks.
41 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria, 3 to 14 April 2017,” p. 2.
42 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), 30 September 
2019, and 21 September 2017. See also, “Landmine blasts kill five in Pakistan’s tribal areas,” Arab News 
(Pakistan), 21 August 2019, www.arabnews.pk/node/1543081/pakistan; “Soldier martyred, 5 injured in 
North Waziristan landmine blast,” Tribal New Network, 25 August 2019, www.tnn.com.pk/soldier-martyred-
5-injured-in-north-waziristan-landmine-blast/; “At least 2 FC personnel killed, 5 injured in Kurram Agency 
blast,” The Nation, 10 July 2017, http://bit.ly/32RwQsf; and Ajmal Wesai, “4 children wounded in Tirinkot 
bomb explosion,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 August 2017, www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/08/05/4-children-
wounded-tirinkot-bomb-explosion. 
43 “Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014: Report 
of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts as submitted to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights,” A/HRC/42/17, 9 August 2019, para. 45, http://bit.ly/2JpVUPg. 
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In April 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that Houthi-planted landmines had killed at 
least 140 civilians since 2018.44 In November 2018, employees at the Hodeidah port accused 
Houthi forces of placing landmines in the area around the port’s entrances.45 Previously, the 
Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that Houthi forces laid more than 300,000 
landmines between 2016 and 2018.46 International media reported that mine clearance 
teams funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) cleared and destroyed hundreds of Houthi-
laid mines in 2018.47
There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have 
used landmines in Yemen.
UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can 
no longer sign and ratify the Treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines 
signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 
32 acceded.48
No states joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period. 
The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the 
last signatory yet to ratify.
ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Since 1997, an annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside 
the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the 
humanitarian rationale of the Treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a 
dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive 
UNGA resolutions.49
On 5 December 2018, UNGA Resolution 73/61 calling for universalization and full 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, 
and 16 abstentions.50 This is a slight increase in votes in favor from the 2017 resolution (167) 
and maintains the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, 
most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the United States (US), and Vietnam.51
44 “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Kill Civilians, Block Aid,” Human Rights Watch, 22 April 2019, www.hrw.org/
news/2019/04/22/yemen-houthi-landmines-kill-civilians-block-aid. 
45 “Houthis mine Hodeidah port entrances as pro-government offensive pauses,” Middle East Eye, 
14 November 2018, http://bit.ly/2qQhndX. 
46 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” 
September 2018, p. 4, http://bit.ly/32PfuMp.
47 See for example, @LostWeapons, “another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in yemen. TM62 
anti tank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs,” 12 October 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/
status/1050646259185242112/photo/1; and @BrowneGareth, “UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi 
landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS,” 17 
July 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/BrowneGareth/status/1019296299391373312/photo/1.
48 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of 
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before 
entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
49 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
50 The 16 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, and Vietnam.









Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects 
the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. None 
have done so during the reporting period. At least 70 NSAGs committed to halt using 
antipersonnel mines since 1997.52 The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have 
no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state 
structures. 
In November 2016, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the Colombian government signed an agreement 
to end the armed conflict. This halted the FARC’s widespread improvised landmine use 
and resulted in the surrender and destruction of its stockpiled mines and components. In 
August 2019, however, a small contingent of rebel, former FARC, leaders announced that 
they were entering a “new stage of armed struggle.”53 It is not yet clear whether that group 
will continue use of improvised antipersonnel mines. Previously, in October 2017, a ceasefire 
was agreed between the government of Colombia under which the National Liberation Army 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) committed not to use antipersonnel landmines that 
could endanger the civilian population.54 However, the ceasefire ended in January 2018, and 
as of October 2019 had not been renewed.55
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.56 Fourty-one 
states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.57
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing 
mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so.58
Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. 
52 As of October 2019, 46 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 20 by self-declaration, four by the 
Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment), and two through 
a Peace Accord (Nepal, Colombia). See, Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/
how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/.
53 Megan Janetsky, “Ex-FARC leaders’ return to arms brings back memories of bloodshed,” Al Jazeera, 
30 August 2019, http://bit.ly/32QcwYh.
54 See, “Acuerdo y comunicado sobre el cese al fuego bilateral y temporal entre el Gobierno y el ELN 
(Agreement and communiqué on the bilateral and temporary ceasefire between the Government and the 
ELN),” Oficina del alto comisionando para la paz, Quito, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/AcuerdoELN2017.
55 Adriaan Alsima, “Colombia’s ELN rebels blame government for failure to agree to ceasefire,” Colombia 
Reports, 2 July 2018, http://bit.ly/31PzjSv.
56 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that 
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
57 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.
58 For example, Singapore’s only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, ST Engineering, a 
government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of 
designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” Local Authority Pension Fund, “ST Engineering 
Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, http://bit.ly/2p5nz17. However, Singapore is still listed as a 
producer as it has not formally committed to not produce landmines in the future.
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In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel 
landmines in the previous five years.59 Until its renounces future production, South Korea 
remains listed as a producer of antipersonnel mines.
Production of antipersonnel mines by India continued in 2018 and orders indicate that 
production extended into 2019. Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible 
online government transaction database list private companies providing component 
parts for APER-1B antipersonnel mines to the Indian Ordnance Factories, a state-owned 
enterprise, into June 2019.60 Previously, in September 2018, Indian military officials told the 
Monitor that the final assembly of complete mine remains under the exclusive control of 
Indian Ordnance Factories.61 In the previous two years, components were produced under 
these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition Factory Khadki in Maharashtra state.62
NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen.63 In September 2018, the arms consultancy Conflict Armament 
Research reported that Houthi forces were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-
activated IEDs (improvised antipersonnel landmines). It found that this includes the 
standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared 
sensors.64
Previously, in January 2017, MAG reported that Islamic State in Syria and Iraq produced 
near-factory quality improvised landmines on a large scale.65
TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the 
mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the 
Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state 
transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums 
on the export of antipersonnel mines: landmine producers China, India, Pakistan, Russia, 
Singapore, South Korea, plus Israel, Kazakhstan, and the US. Other past exporters have made 
59 Email to the ICBL, from Soonhee Choi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea, 
22 August 2019.
60 In February 2018, Supreme Industries Ltd was listed as having concluded a contract for production of 
material for antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders, http://ofbindia.gov.
in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. However, no other orders were listed as concluded between 
December 2017 and September 2018 for antipersonnel mines. Components and materials for directional 
mines and antivehicle mines were listed.
61 Landmine Monitor meeting with Cdre. Nishant Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Sumit Kabthiyal, 
Ministry of Defense, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), 
Geneva, 27 August 2018.
62 The following companies were listed as having concluded contracts listed for production of components 
of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and 
November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s 
Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, 
Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition, the following 
companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, 
Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. 
Mine types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines, http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.
php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. Indian Ordnance Factories website, http://ofb.gov.in/vendor/general_
reports/show/registered_vendors/820.
63 Previous lists of NSAGs producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq, Syria, and Thailand. However, 
with the loss of territory by Islamic State, it was not possible to confirm that this activity continued in the 
reporting period.
64 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” 
September 2018, http://bit.ly/32PfuMp.
65 MAG Issue Brief, “Landmine Emergency: Twenty years on from the Ottawa Treaty the world is facing a new 








statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. Iran 
also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.66
At least five types of 
antipersonnel mines produced 
in the 1980s have been used in 
Yemen since 2013. None of these 
mines were among the four types 
of antipersonnel mines that Yemen 
has reported stockpiling in the 
past, including for training mine 
clearance personnel.
The evidence of further use 
of antipersonnel mines starting 
in 2016 suggests either that the 
2002 declaration to States Parties 
on the completion of landmine 
stockpile destruction was 
incorrect, or that these mines were 
acquired from another source 
after 2002. In a September 2016 
letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by 
the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled 
weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that their government 
had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.67 In 




The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty 
stockpile antipersonnel landmines.69 In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, 
states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global 
collective total may be less than 50 million.70
66 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were 
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor 
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian 
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the 
coast of the Gaza Strip.
67 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 7 September 2016, 
bit.ly/YemenHRWSept2016.
68 Ibid., 2 April 2017, bit.ly/YemenLetterApr2017HRW. 
69 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. 
70 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an 
amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known 
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are 
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China 
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
Types of antipersonnel mines previously  
stockpiled by Yemen and types used after 2013
Antipersonnel mines 
originally stockpiled
Antipersonnel mines used  
after 2013
PP-Mi-SR GLD-150A (Claymore-type produced by 
China)
PMD-6 Gyata-64 (formerly produced by  
Hungary)
PMN-1 PMN-1 and PMN-2 
POMZ-2 PPM-2 (produced by former East  
Germany)
PSM-1 (formerly produced by  
Bulgaria)
Hybrid PMN & PPM-2 (origin not known)
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It is unclear if all 30 states are currently stockpiling 
antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have 
provided contradictory information regarding its 
possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco 
have stated that they have only small stockpiles 
used solely for training purposes in clearance and 
detection techniques.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely 
destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an 
element of ammunition management programs and 
the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent 
years, such stockpile destruction has been reported 
in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Korea, the US, and Vietnam.
NON-STATE ARMED GROUP 
STOCKPILES
Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to obtain factory-
made antipersonnel mines now that production and 
transfers have largely halted under the Mine Ban 
Treaty. Some NSAGs in states not party have acquired 
landmines by stealing them from government stocks, 
purchasing them from corrupt officials, or removing 
them from minefields. Most that use mines appear to 
make their own improvised landmines from locally 
available materials.
The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces, reports of 
significant use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing 
mine stockpiles. 
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY 
STATES PARTIES
At least 160 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel 
mines. This includes 93 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction 
and 67 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some 
cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 1.4 million destroyed in 2018.
Three States Parties possess more than a combined four million antipersonnel mines 
remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.5 million), Greece (643,267), and Sri Lanka (77,865). It 
is unclear if State Party Tuvalu possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines.71 Somalia clarified 
in its annual transparency report that it does not possess stocks.
In November 2018, Oman announced the completion of destruction of its stockpiles ahead 
of its 1 February 2019 deadline.72 It began the destruction process on 13 September 2015
71 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia 
acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is 
“putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines 
have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which had a destruction deadline of 1 
October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014. Tuvalu, Mine 
Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, 
bit.ly/MBTSomalia2013Art7. 
72 Statement of Oman, Mine Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 29 November 2018, http://
bit.ly/OmanMSP2018. Oman reiterated this information in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2019.
Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel 
mines
Russia 26.5 million
Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total 45 million







































 and completed destruction on 25 September 2018. Oman destroyed 6,104 antipersonnel 
mines in 2018.73
Sri Lanka declared a significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines in November 2018 
when it submitted its initial transparency measures report. Its deadline for completion of 
destruction is 1 June 2029, but Sri Lanka stated its intent to complete stockpile destruction 
by the end of 2020.74 Sri Lanka reported that the destruction of 57,033 antipersonnel mines 
had occurred prior to November 2018, for a total stockpile prior to destruction of 134,898 
antipersonnel mines.
Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.75 Neither state has indicated when 
the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Cartagena Action 
Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without 
delay, and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to 
provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states 
to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES BY NSAGS
Disarmament of the FARC in Colombia, including destruction of its antipersonnel landmine 
stockpile and components, occurred under UN supervision and was completed on 22 
September 2017. The UN mission destroyed 3,528 antipersonnel mines formerly belonging 
to the FARC, as well as components, including more than 38,000kgs of explosives and more 
than 46,000 detonators.76
From 2006 to 2019, Polisario Front of Western Sahara undertook eight public destruction 
events in order to totally destroy its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Geneva 
Call Deed of Commitment. On 6 January 2019, with an eighth and final destruction of 2,485 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines, it destroyed the last of its stockpiled mines, which once 
totaled 20,493.77
MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH 
(ARTICLE 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or 
mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum 
number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”
A total of 69 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training 
and research purposes, of which 33 retain more than 1,000 mines and three (Sri Lanka, 
Finland, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-six States Parties 
have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 37 states that 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.78
73 Oman, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), submitted April 2019, states that in 2018 Oman 
destroyed 502 No. 7 dingbat mines; 4,624 M409 mines; and 978 DM 31 mines, http://bit.ly/OmanArt72019.
74 Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, November 2018, http://bit.ly/SriLankaArt72018.
75 Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
76 “Misión de la ONU concluyó hoy la inhabilitación de armas de las Farc,” Radio Nacional de Colombia, 22 
September 2017, http://bit.ly/2BNpjia.
77 Geneva Call, “Final destruction of 2,485 stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Western Sahara,” Press Release, 
22 January 2019, http://bit.ly/2Nk2YhH.
78 In 2018, Cambodia, Argentina, and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpile retained for training 
and research, and the UK announced that their stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not 
fall under the scope of the convention. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial transparency report, which was 
originally due in 2012.
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States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines











Sri Lanka 21,153 (2018) 21,153 0 N/A –
Finland 16,192 (2017) 16,500 0 2017 –
Bangladesh 12,050 (2016) 15,000 0 2013 –
Turkey 9,259 (2018) 16,000 56 2018 5,159
Sweden 6,009 (2018) 13,948 5 2018 –
Greece 5,599 (2018) 7,224 28 2018 –
Croatia 4,973 (2018) 17,500 79 3 2018 –
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 –
Belarus 4,505 (2018) 7,530 0 2017 1,484
Tunisia 4,405 (2018) 5,000 55 2018 –
France 3,941 (2018) 4,539 0 2016 -
Yemen 3,760 (2016) 4,000 0 2008 –
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever –
Bulgaria 3,318 (2018) 10,466 6 2018 6,446
Serbia 3,134 (2018) 5,000 0 2017 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear –
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 N/R 2009 2,524
Romania 2,395 (2018) 4,000 0 2013 1,500
Czech Rep. 2,180 (2018) 4,859 26 2018 –
Belgium 2,066 (2018) 5,980 52 2018 –
Peru 2,015 (2018) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2017) 2,000 N/R None ever –
Canada 1,878 (2018) 1,781 10 2017 –
Denmark 1,783 (2015) 4,991 N/R 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 –
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 –
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 –
Spain 1,547 (2017) 10,000 N/R 2017 6,000
Angola 1,304 (2018) 1,460 0 2018 –
Chile 1,192 (2018) 28,647 1,005 2018 23,694
Slovakia 1,035 (2018) 7,000 52 2018 5,500
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 –
Botswana 1,002 (2018) 1,019 17 Unclear –
Partial total 138,582 257,996 1,315 64,664
79 Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2019, http://bit.ly/2WhJ7DA. There is a 
discrepancy in Croatia’s reporting on its retained mines. The 2019 report lists 4,973 mines retained for 
training and research, a decrease of 77 from the number reported in 2018 (5,050). However, Croatia lists 
only three mines as consumed in 2018 in accordance with Article 3—one each of type PMA-1A, PMA-2, 
and PMR-2A.








In addition to those listed above, another 34 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 
mines and together possess a total of 14,842 retained mines.80
In May 2019, Thailand announced it had carried out a review of its retained mines and 
would destroy a further 3000 before the end of 2019.81 However, at an event on 6 August 
2019, Thailand destroyed its entire number of retained mines of 3,133, at which Thai Armed 
Forces Joint Chief of Staff General Chaichana Nakkerd stated “From now on, Thailand will no 
longer retain any more anti-personnel landmines.”82
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained 
antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including 
by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel 
mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 13 States Parties retain 
antipersonnel mines in this condition.83
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining 
mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States 
Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are 
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have 
been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of eight States Parties have never 
reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into 
force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken 
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu 
(due 28 August 2012).
As of 1 October 2019, 49% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar 
year 2018. A total of 83 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2018. 
Of this latter group, most have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or 
more years.84
80 Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Japan (898), Netherlands (889), BiH (834), Honduras (826), 
Sudan (739), Mauritania (728), Cambodia (720), Portugal (694), Italy (617), South Africa (576), Germany 
(465), Zimbabwe (450), Cyprus (440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Brazil (364), Congo (322), Cote d’Ivoire 
(290), Slovenia (272), Uruguay (260), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Jordan 
(100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).
81 Statement of Thailand (written submission), Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on Article 
3, Geneva, 24 May 2019, http://bit.ly/ThaiMBTIM2019.
82 Thanaporn Promyanyai, “Thai army destroys thousands of landmines in jungle,” AFP, 6 August 2019, 
https://yhoo.it/3435yzd. 
83 Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Serbia, and the UK.
84 States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Andorra, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep. of ), Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, 
Nigeria, Niger, Niue, North Macedonia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
22 
Nigeria, Yemen, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use of 
improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination 
in their annually updated Article 7 reports.
Morocco, a state not party, submitted a voluntary report in 2017–2019 (as well as in 
2006, 2008–2011, and 2013). In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao PDR (2010), 












































































*Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. 
The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them.
**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
Another six States Parties that have already declared Article 5 completion or declared 
no contamination under their jurisdiction or control, currently have or are suspected to have 
residual contamination:
Algeria: Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 commitments on 10 February 2017, 
validated at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, in December 2017. However, it continues 
to find and destroy isolated mines. From December 2016 to October 2018, a total of 668 
20-YEAR OVERVIEW
As of September 2019, a total of 33 States Parties have an identified threat of antipersonnel
mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control.
Cyprus**  
Democratic Republic








“isolated” antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed by army units designated to deal 
with residual contamination.1 As Algeria declares the contamination and destroys the mines 
found within the year, it is compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.
Burundi: Burundi declared fulfilment of its Article 5 commitments on 1 April 2014, but 
from 2017 to 2019, it found a few (four) isolated mines which it cleared and destroyed. It 
maintains a national police force trained by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) for the collection 
and destruction of residual contamination.2 As Burundi declares the contamination and 
destroys the mines found within the year, it is compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. 
Djibouti: Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France 
declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, 
but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border 
following a border conflict, in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full 
compliance with its Article 5 obligations.3
Kuwait: There have been a number of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties 
reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2017, there were four reported casualties, an increase from 
three in 2016.4 In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines in 
the country, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War.5 The landmines are believed to 
be mainly on the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, areas used by shepherds 
for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with 
its Article 5 obligations.
Moldova: The Republic of Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, 
made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility 
for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues 
to assert jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings in Geneva, on 2 June 2008.6
Namibia: Namibia made a statement at the Second Review Conference that it was in 
full compliance with Article 5, and it has reported that it has no mined areas under its 
jurisdiction and control. However, it is suspected that there are mined areas in the north of 





1 Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 October 2018, p. 39.
2 Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 4 October 2019, p. 6.
3 See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Djibouti: Mine Action,” 17 December 2012, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2018/djibouti/mine-action.aspx.
4 ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Kuwait: Casualties,” 10 October 2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2018/kuwait/casualties.aspx. 
5 “Torrential downpour unearths landmines in Kuwait,” The National, 21 November 2018, http://bit.
ly/2NjHzFh.
6 See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Moldova: Mine Action,” 17 December 2012, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2018/moldova/mine-action.aspx.
7 ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Namibia: Mine Action,” 13 July 2011, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/
namibia/mine-action.aspx.
In addition to the 33 States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines, there are also
26 states and other areas not party to the Mine Ban Treaty that have antipersonnel mine
contamination. Lao PDR and Lebanon are party to the Convention of Cluster Munitions and

















States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine  



























Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.
NEW CONTAMINATION
New use of antipersonnel mines in recent and ongoing conflicts has exacerbated the 
remaining challenge for some states in addressing antipersonnel mine contamination. In 
some cases, this includes contamination by mines of an improvised nature. In many cases, 
the new contamination has not yet been fully quantified. 
Over the last five years (2014–2018) there was new contamination in several States 
Parties including Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Yemen. In 2018, new 
use of antipersonnel mines was reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen.
Afghanistan: Continuing conflict between the government, the Taliban, and other armed 
groups is still adding new contamination, particularly by improvised mines.8
Chad: Mine incidents were reported in Chad in August 20169 and August 2017.10 In April 
2018, soldiers were killed and wounded during a series of operations in the Lake Chad 
region against Boko Haram forces that reportedly used landmines and suicide bombs.11
Colombia: The National Liberation Army (ELN) and drug-trafficking groups continue the 
struggle for control in about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities.12 In ELN strongholds, 
such as the coastal department of Chocó, it has been reported that actors are emplacing 
mines in order to protect their territory.13
Iraq: Occupation of large areas of Iraq by Islamic State after 2014 added extensive 
contamination to Iraq’s existing legacy mined areas. Much of the new contamination 
comprises improvised mines and other explosive devices. Many of these devices are reported 
to be antipersonnel mines prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.
8 See, for example, reports that armed opposition groups mined the highway linking Kabul and Ghazni during 
fighting in August 2018. “Intense fighting as Taliban presses to take Afghan city,” Reuters, 12 August 2018. 
9 “Boko Haram landmine kills four Chadian soldiers,” Reuters, 27 August 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-
nigeria-security-chad-idUSKCN1120KY.
10 “Tchad: un véhicule d’orpailleurs saute sur une mine près de Zouar dans le Tibesti, 8 morts et 11 blessés” 
(“Chad: A miners’ vehicle hits on a mine near Zouar in Tibesti, 8 dead and 11 wounded”), Tchad Convergence, 
20 August 2017, http://bit.ly/2pS2rvk.
11 “Nigeria: Boko Haram – Military Winning the Lake Chad War Despite Losses – General Irabor,” Premium 
Times, 29 April 2018, http://bit.ly/2JmZKIU.
12 International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and Mine 
Action Review interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), in Vista 
Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda and Sergio Mahecha, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), in 
Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, in San Juan de Arama, 
10 August 2018; and with John Charles Cagua Zambrano and Francisco Profeta Cardoso, Columbian 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), in Centro Poblado de Santo Domingo, 11 August 2018.
13 Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 
1 October 2018.
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Nigeria: At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared 
that it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.14 However, since 2017, 
there have been reports of numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties 
from landmines and a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko 
Haram in the northeast of the country.15
Tunisia: Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of 
casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the last five years. It 
is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.
Yemen: The ongoing conflict between the Houthi rebels in the north and the Saudi-led 
coalition in the south which flared in March 2015 has led to further contamination, although 
its full extent is unknown. Previously cleared areas, such as Aden (declared free of mines in 
2003), are believed to be re-contaminated.16
Over the last five years there was unconfirmed use of antipersonnel mines in States 
Parties Cameroon and Mali. 
Cameroon: Mine contamination has been reported in Cameroon since 2015, with incidents 
reported involving “roadside IEDs”.17 Cameroonian military officials also reported in 2015 that 
large numbers of landmines had been planted by Boko Haram along Cameroon’s Nigerian 
border.18
Mali: Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017, it has 
experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs in the center of the country.19
There was confirmed new mine use by government forces in state not party Myanmar in 
2018 and the first half of 2019. Landmine Monitor did not document or confirm any use of 
antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces in Syria during 2018. 
There was confirmed new use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar and India. It is 
also likely that NSAGs have continued to use improvised mines in Syria, although this was 
not confirmed.
EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION
Based on information provided by official sources, massive antipersonnel mine contamination 
(defined by ICBL-CMC as more than 100km²) is believed to exist in States Parties Afghanistan, 
Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. One state not 
party, Azerbaijan and one other area, Western Sahara, are also believed to have massive 
contamination. 
However, the extent of contamination estimated in some countries may in the future be 
subject to significant revision—either increased or decreased—based on survey results. For 
example, Ethiopia, which is currently believed to be heavily contaminated, with an estimated 
14 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 
2011. In January 2017, a civil war-era landmine was found in Ebonyi state, which villagers thought was 
an IED. Police forensics concluded it was a landmine left over from the conflict that ended 47 years 
previous, which had washed up in a river. A bomb squad destroyed the device, and according to the 
police, the area was searched and no evidence of other contamination was found. J. Eze, “Nigeria: Civil 
War Explosive Found in Ebonyi Community – Police,” AllAfrica, 17 January 2017, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201701180015.html.
15 J. Payne, “Nigeria’s military believes it has Boko Haram cornered, but landmines are getting in the way,” 
Reuters, 2 May 2015, http://bit.ly/2MQLGK0; and “Nigeria: Landmine Blast Kills Soldier, Three Vigilantes in 
Sambisa Forest,” AllAfrica, 24 April 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201504240329.html. 
16 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9.
17 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS explosive hazard mitigation response in Cameroon, 9 January–13 April 
2017,” 30 April 2017, p. 11; and email from Camille Aubourg, UNMAS, 17 September 2018.
18 M.E. Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram,” Voice of America News, 3 March 
2015; and M.E. Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens with Land Mines,” Voice of America News, 24 May 2015.

















total of 1,056km² of contaminated land, has also reported that it expects only about 2% of 
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to contain mines.20 Ukraine currently estimates around 
7,000km² of contaminated land,21 but this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been 
conducted. 
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq have all suffered recent contamination due to conflict and 
are required to reassess the scope and nature of their contamination. Ongoing conflict, 
insecurity and a lack of access to certain areas hamper these efforts.22 Thailand, Cambodia, 
20 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 10 and 35. However, Ethiopia 
has reported different estimates of the percentage of SHAs expected to be confirmed, between 0.5% and 
3%. See the Revised National Mine Action Plan for 2017–2020, October 2017, pp. 1–3, & 9; statement 
of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 
June 2017; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 
5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 42. 
21 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 1.
22 Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, August 2012, p. 23; Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9; and Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 
deadline Extension Request, March 2017, pp. 10–12, & 88.
Estimated extent of mine contamination in States Parties, September 2019
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Extent of contamination not defined
Nigeria Ukraine Oman
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas.
**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control. 
Palestine
30 
and Turkey still have to verify the extent of contamination along border areas where access 
has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation, insecurity, or territorial disputes.23 
Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its control in 
Northern Cyprus, although its most recent extension request in 2013 does not include a 
timeline for clearance of mines there. 
Some states have continued to improve their understanding of the extent of contamination 
using land release methodologies to cancel suspected areas by non-technical survey and 
to reduce confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) through technical survey. Angola, Croatia, 
Cambodia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zimbabwe have all been able to reduce 
previous estimates of contaminated land through the implementation of survey.24
Several states not party for which no estimate of contamination is provided are believed 
to be massively contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea 
and South Korea and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern 
boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data 
is available on the extent of contamination.25 Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have 
widespread contamination, but the extent is not known.
LANDMINE CLEARANCE
Among States Parties, total clearance of landmines in 2018 was at least 140km².26 This 
represents a decrease from the estimated 195km² cleared in 2017. Over the five-year period 
from 2014–2018, total clearance of landmines among States Parties is estimated to be 
almost 800km², with at least 661,491 landmines destroyed.
However, these figures should be taken with caution due to the problems with obtaining 
accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data 
regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated mine clearance figures from the 
amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-technical survey. 
Not all States Parties have provided annual reports.
The figures may also underestimate the true amount cleared as clearance by some actors, 
such as armed forces, police, or commercial operators, may not be systematically reported. In 
some states, informal clearance or community-based clearance has been conducted, which 
is not subject to quality management and entry into the national databases. In some cases, 
land was cleared that was found to contain no mines. For further details of land release 
results for the period 2014–2018 and 20-year totals where available, see individual country 
profiles on the Monitor website.27
Based on the available data, Croatia has cleared the most land in the last five years at 
195km², followed by Cambodia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all 
continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity. In Iraq, IED clearance 
has not been consistently included in clearance figures as it was not known how much of 
the contamination was by improvised mines. Reported figures for clearance in 2017 were 
high at over 85km², of which 55km² was areas affected by IEDs. However, the device type was 
23 Improved relationships between Thailand and Cambodia have led to cooperation to survey and clear 
border areas. See, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” The Phnom Penh Post, 24 
September 2019, http://bit.ly/2pRUu9t.
24 Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 August 2017, p. 5; CMAA, 
“National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,” p. 9; and Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline 
Extension Request, 29 March 2018, p. 7.
25 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-
Hoon, “Find One Million: War with Landmines,” Korea Times, 3 June 2010.
26 This refers to land cleared and does not include land released or canceled through survey.

















not specified and large areas were reported as cleared but with no devices destroyed.28 The 
amount of land reported cleared in Iraq in 2018 is low compared to 2017 figures, although 
over 14km² was released through survey. Yemen was able to clear 0.64km² as part of its 
emergency response in four governates from 2016–2018. It also destroyed over 14,000 
antipersonnel landmines in the five years from 2014. .29
Ecuador, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, and Ukraine have all cleared well under 1km² in the last 
five years. Ecuador’s clearance output dropped in 2016 due to an earthquake in April of that 
year that diverted the armed forces away from demining.30 For Palestine, clearance in the 
West Bank is constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by 
Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations, although HALO Trust is currently 
conducting clearance in the West Bank.31 Serbia has reported lack of funding, climatic 
conditions, unrecorded mined areas, and groups of mines laid haphazardly complicated 
clearance and survey efforts.32 The extent of contamination in Ukraine is currently unknown 
and survey and clearance by international operators only began in 2015. Ukraine is currently 
establishing a mine action program.
Several countries have failed to report figures for mine clearance on a regular basis. Chad, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Niger have not reported consistently on clearance since 2014.
In some countries, a decrease in clearance output has been matched by an increase in the 
amount of land released through survey. In Croatia, there was a 20% decrease in area cleared 
in 2017, although the amount of land released through survey was doubled.
No mine clearance was reported in the last five years in Cyprus or Argentina. Cyprus states 
that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.33 Argentina 
reports that it is mine-affected as a result of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands/Malvinas, but that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had 
access to the islands due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK.34
In Algeria, which declared completion of clearance in 2016, no areas were reported as 
cleared, but 668 isolated mines have been destroyed between December 2016 and October 
2018.35
Clearance of mined areas 2014–2018 (km²)
State Party 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total cleared
APMs 
destroyed
Afghanistan 22.28 13.44 27.12 28.12 30.04 121 57,051
Angola 2.2 4.1 1.2 1.2 1.04 9.74 N/R
Argentina See clearance figures under UK
BiH 1.85 1.64 1.34 0.69 0.92 6.44 8,718
Cambodia 54.38 46.47 25.33 27.68 36.66 190.52 43,384
Chad N/R N/R 0.58 N/R N/R 0.58 N/R
Chile 2.14 1.89 3.52 0.86 0.65 9.06 4,000
28 See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Iraq: Mine Action,” 16 November 2018, http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2018/iraq/mine-action.aspx.
29 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, pp. 14–15; and 
Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form J, p. 25. 
30 Ecuador, Article 5 Implementation Update, June 2017.
31 HALO Trust, “West Bank,” undated, www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/middle-east/west-bank/.
32 Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2018, p. 7.
33 Cyprus, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.
34 Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 April 2010. 
35 Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 October 2018, p. 39. 
32 
State Party 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total cleared
APMs 
destroyed
Colombia 0.54 0.36 0.29 0.38 0.84 2.41 1,014
Croatia 37.7 40.6 38.2 29.88 48.82 195.2 7,858
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DRC 0.33 0.49 0.37 0.44 0.27 36 1.9 5
Ecuador 0.039 0.066 0.0001 0.0154 0.014 0.134 6,219
Eritrea N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R
Ethiopia N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 1.4937 582
Iraq 17.08 25.19 27.36 85.24 4.03 158.9 60,128
Jordan 0.55 0.65 1.36 1.44 0.96 4.96 420
Niger N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R 38 0.039 1,075
Palestine 0.021 0.063 0.034 0.041 39 0.026 0.185 626
Peru 0.0084 0.076 0.018 0.009 0.015 0.126 3,797
Senegal N/R 0.91 0.14 0.1 0 1.15 25
Serbia 0.27 0.41 0 0 0.21 0.89 46
Somalia 4.6 0 1.2 0.76 N/R 6.56 53
S. Sudan 8.19 9.46 10.53 9.85 8.53 46.56 5,080
Sri Lanka 2.66 3.58 2.8 3.25 N/R 12.29 150,384
Sudan 2.47 0.42 1.04 0.71 0.97 5.61 479
Tajikistan 0.65 0.25 0.5 0.62 0.59 2.61 14,395
Thailand 0.22 2.04 0.39 0.42 0.52 3.59 19,967
Turkey 0.15 0 0.12 0.82 2.08 3.17 169,882
Ukraine 0 0 0 0.22 0 40 0.22 5
UK 0 0.59 0.94 1.05 0.57 41 43.15 4,173
Yemen 0.34 0 3.07 0 0.64 42 4.05 14,031
Zimbabwe 0.49 0.71 1.67 1.66 2.11 6.64 83,254
Total 159.16 153.41 149.12 195.46 140.51 799.17 661,491
36 2014–2017 figures reported in DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 2017, p. 10. Figures reported 
by ICBL-CMC for 2014–2017 are lower (2014: 0.22km²; 2015: 0.31km²; 2016: 0.37km²; 2017: 0.44km²).
37 Mine clearance figure for period 2016–2018. Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 
2018), Form D, p. 4; Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 8 and 13.
38 Figures for period June 2011 to May 2014. Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for period June 2011–
May 2014), Form I, p. 19.
39 US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” US: PM/WRA and 
CISR, 2019, p. 46.
40 Ukraine is currently establishing a mine action program and has yet to survey the SHA. Figures given for 
clearance in 2017 are for clearance by HALO Trust. See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Ukraine: Mine Action,” 
12 November 2018, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.
41 Land release figures for Phase 5a of the clearance of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, November 2016–
March 2018 are given as 4.81km². UK, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 6, 
and Annex 1, p. 5.
42 The figure of 0.64km² is for clearance as part of the emergency response (2016–2018) in four governates. 
The figures for ordnance destroyed are for five years from 2014, but with the large majority having been 
cleared in the years 2016–2018. Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 
8 August 2019, pp. 14–15; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form J, p. 25. 

















In several states not party, mine clearance was known to have occurred between 2014–
2018, although it was not formally reported. In Syria, international and national operators, 
both civilian and military have been undertaking clearance. There are media reports of 
clearance in India, and in Iran, commercial clearance occurred in oil- and gas-producing areas.43
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT THROUGH TREATY 
IMPLEMENTATION
COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 COMMITMENTS
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel 
mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. 
States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations 
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.
 
  
The first States Parties to declare themselves mine-free were Germany in 1997 and 
Bulgaria and Hungary in 1999. Both Germany and Hungary later found SHAs, which were 
verified in 2013. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 before the Mine Ban 
Treaty was created. In the first 10 years of treaty implementation (1999–2009), 10 States 




Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999. 
States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 
1997
1997 Germany (2013, after 
verification)
2009 Albania, Greece (2013, after 
verification), Rwanda, Tunisia, Zambia
1999 Bulgaria, Hungary (2013, after 
verification)
2010 Nicaragua
2003 Costa Rica 2011 Burundi (2014, after verification)
2004 Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname 2012 Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Uganda
2005 Guatemala 2013 Bhutan, Venezuela
2006 North Macedonia 2014
2007 Eswatini 2015 Mozambique (2017, after verification)
2008 France, Malawi 2017
Several States Parties have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines, although 
subsequent survey and verification revealed previously unknown SHAs. Burundi, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, and Mozambique have all cleared and/or verified these 
43 ICBL-CMC, Landmine Monitor 2018, www.the-monitor.org/LMM2018.
44 Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and on 29 November 2018 at the Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, announced that it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 of the 
treaty.
                  
             
         
Since the Mine Ban Treaty came in to force in 1999, 33 states and areas have reported
clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory. Thirty-one of these were States
Parties, one state not party (Nepal), and one other area (Taiwan).
    Algeria, Mauritania
Montenegro, Jordan (2018, after verification)
              
           
            
 In the last five years (2014–2018), six States Parties have declared themselves mine- 
free: Algeria 2017; Burundi 2014; Jordan 2014; Mauritania 2017;44 Montenegro 2014; and 
Mozambique 2015. No state was declared free of antipersonnel mine contamination in 
2018.
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suspected contaminated areas and fulfilled their Article 5 obligations. Algeria completed 
clearance of all known minefields in 2017 but continues to find and clear isolated mines. 
Two States Parties that originally declared completion of clearance are now considered 
to be contaminated. Nigeria was declared mine-free in 2011, but during 2017–2019, 
antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature emplaced by Boko Haram have been reported 
in the northeast of the country. Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban 
Treaty in 2012 but following verification work found further contamination in the Jordan 
Valley and along its northern border with Syria. Jordan undertook a process to verify and 
check these areas, and as of June 2018, stated that no further action is needed.45
PROGRESS ON MEETING ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES
At the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014, States Parties agreed 
to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the 
urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined 








Yemen (current deadline March 2023) and BiH 
(current deadline March 2021) have both requested 
interim extensions to enable them to better define 
their remaining contamination. It is expected that both 
will submit further extension requests in March 2022 
and March 2020 respectively. It is also expected that 
Iraq will require more time to assess the extent of new 
contamination. South Sudan has reported it is unlikely to 
meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline and that it intends to 
submit an additional extension request for a period of five 









45 Email from Col. Mohammed Breikat, National Director, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation 
(NCDR), 19 September 2019.
46 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, additional information 
submitted 21 June 2018, p. 1.
47 Presentation by Jurkuc Barach Jurkuc, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7–8 June 2018.
48 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Mine Ban 
Treaty Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for 
extensions, 24 November 2008. 
Deminer Rabih Zein at work in northern Lebanon.
©O. van den Broeck/HI, November 2018
 As of September 2019, 27 States Parties currently have deadlines to meet their Article 5
obligations before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines after 2025— 
Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028). Palestine and Sri Lanka 
became States Parties in 2018 and are within their first 10-year deadline for completion of
their Article 5 obligations. While Croatia has requested an
extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey
and clearance operations will be completed by the end of
2025, leaving only administrative/paperwork issues to be
settled at the beginning of 2026.46
 Zimbabwe, a State Party since 1999, has requested
the most extensions to its Article 5 deadlines. Its fifth
extension request has a deadline of 31 December
2025. Zimbabwe’s demining program was constrained
by economic sanctions, a shortage of equipment, and a lack of international assistance.48 
However, Zimbabwe is now likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations, as are Sri Lanka, 
DRC, and Peru. It is also feasible that Chile, Ecuador, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, and the 

















States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, 
and status of any deadline extensions as of October 2019







Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years (1st) 1 March 2023 210.24km²
(121.63km² CHA, 
88.61km² SHA)49







Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years (1st)
3 years (2nd)
1 March 2023 See UK obligations
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
2 years (2nd)
1 March 2021 1,113km²
(1,018km² SHA, 
95km² CHA)51
















(7 CHAs, 421 SHAs)53
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years (1st) 1 March 2020 4.45km²54
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years (1st) 1 March 2021 46.02km²55
(Extent unknown but 
officially estimated)
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
7 years (2nd)
1 March 2026 355.5km2
 (220.34km2 CHA, 
135.21km2 SHA)56
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st)
3 years (2nd)
3 years (3rd)
1 July 2022 1.7km²57
(1.29km² SHA, 
0.43km² CHA) 
















49 As of December 2018. Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 6. 
50 As of April 2019. Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4. 
51 As of end 2018. BiH, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 7. There are 
discrepancies with the data provided in the Second Mine Ban Treaty Extension Request, March 2018.
52 As of December 2018. Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 5. CMAA, 
“National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,” p. 9, gives the figure as 946km².
53 Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, HCND, Chad, 19 June 2018, quoted in Mine Action 
Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
54 As of December 2018. Chile, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form F, p. 17.
55 Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 30 April 2018. The statement of Colombia at the Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26–30 November 2018, stated that estimated contamination was 
51.24km², but this amount was reportedly reduced through demining efforts.
56 As of end 2018. Croatia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 9.
57 As of May 2019. UNMAS, “Programmes: Cyprus,” May 2019, www.unmas.org/en/programmes/cyprus.
58 As of December 2018. DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 4. This is more 
than the 0.50km² recorded in 2017. It is reported that 30 new zones of 470,782m² were identified.
59 As of 31 December 2018. Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 9.
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(SHA 1,050km², CHA 
6.30km²)
Iraq 1 February 
2018













(CHA 0.039km², SHA 
0.196km²)64 
Palestine 1 June 2028 N/A N/A 0.4km2
(CHA) 





Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
1 March 2021 0.49km²66
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years (1st)
4 years (2nd)
1 March 2023 1.73km267
(8 areas in 4 
villages)
Somalia 1 October 
2022
N/A N/A 72.189km²
(28 CHA, 46 SHA)68
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A N/A 29.78km²69
(CHA 3.27km², SHA 
26.50km²)
60 As of December 2013. Eritrea, Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 
2014, p. 8. No updates on the extent of contamination since 2013.
61 As of April 2019. Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 4; and Mine 
Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 9.
62        
 
 
63   
 
64 Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2013–April 2018), Annex 1, p. 19.
65 As of December 2018. Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form F, p. 11.
66 As of 31 December 2018. Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 3. 
This figure is inconsistent with figures given in the Article 7 reports of previous years.
67 As of April 2019. Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.
68 Full extent of contamination is still unknown. Somalia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar 
year 2018), Form C, p. 5. This number is slightly different to survey conducted before 2018, which gave 
the figure 72.289km². Somalia notes in the Article 7 report for 2018 that it was not able to provide a full 
picture of landmine contamination due to the transfer of the IMSMA database from UNMAS to SEMA. 
Different figures for the extent of contamination are also provided on p. 20.
69 South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 3.
As of December 2019. Iraq, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), pp. 20–21. This 
compares to the 1,195.56km² of contamination identified in Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension 
Request, March 2017, pp. 26 and 78. The extent of recent contamination has not been fully quantified.
At end 2018. Jordan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), pp. 13–14. At the end of 
2017, the total area in need of verification was just under 4.25km² across a total of 54 areas (36 in the 
























Sri Lanka 1 June 2028 N/A N/A 24km²70
(CHA 22.42km², SHA 
1.30km²)
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years (1st)
4 years (2nd)
1 April 2023 18.91km²71
(CHA 2.40km², SHA 
16.51km²)
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years (1st)
6 years (2nd)
1 April 2025 12.09km²72
(CHA 7.9km², SHA 
4.19km²)





(SHA in 13 affected 
provinces and 29 
districts)
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years (1st) 1 March 2022 157.32km²74
(in addition to 
701 SHAs, extent 
unknown)
Ukraine 1 June 2016 5 years (1st) 1 June 2021 Unknown
Preliminary estimate 
of 7000km275
UK 1 March 2009 10 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
1 March 2024 6.44km276
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st)
5 years (2nd)
3 years (3rd)
1 March 2023 323.48km²77
(but with large 




of previous areas 
cleared)78 








*Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure 
for mined areas discovered after the expiration of the state’s Article 5 deadline.
70 As of April 2019. Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 9.
71 As of 31 December 2018. Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 8.
72 As of 31 December 2018. Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, pp. 
5 and 6.
73 As of December 2018. Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 
3. In the Five-Year Humanitarian Mine Action Plan 2018–2023, TMAC, March 2019, p. 11, it records the 
remaining contamination in 10 provinces and four regions.
74 As of December 2018. Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 8.
75 Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 1.
76 As of 31 March 2018. Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office (FCO), 21 August 2018.
77 As of 1 March 2017. Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 31 March 2017, Form D, pp. 4 and 9.
78 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 9.
79 As of end 2018. Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form D, p. 2.
38 
EXTENSION REQUESTS IN 2019 
In 2019, six countries requested extensions to their Article 5 deadlines: Argentina, Cambodia, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.
Argentina: Argentina has stated that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because 
it has not had access to the Falkland Islands/Malvinas due to the “illegal occupation” by the 
UK.80 In March 2018, the UK formally submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline 
by an additional five years until 1 March 2024 to complete the demining of the islands.81 In 
March 2019, Argentina submitted an extension request for an additional three years until 1 
March 2023.82 This is a shorter timeframe than the 2018 UK extension deadline of 1 March 
2024. 
Cambodia: Despite over 25 years of humanitarian mine action, Cambodia has only 
addressed half of its antipersonnel mine contamination.83 In April 2019, Cambodia submitted 
a second extension request for six years (2020–2025). Factors that may constrain compliance 
with the new extension request include un-demarcated border areas; available resources; 
inaccessible areas; competing development priorities and demands; and data discrepancies.84 
Cambodia also states that an additional 2,000 deminers will be needed to meet the 2025 
goal,85 along with US$165.3 million, from 1 January 2020–31 December 2025.86
Chad: Chad has requested four extensions to its Article 5 deadline to clear landmines from 
its territories, the most recent request of which was in April 2019 for a four-year extension 
until 2024. Despite each extension request including a plan to conduct survey to better 
understand the extent of contamination, the full extent of the problem remains unknown.87 
Lack of funding has been a recurring challenge for Chad in meeting its Article 5 obligations. 
Other factors have included issues related to weak management, security problems, and 
poor road networks.88
Ethiopia: Ethiopia has requested two extensions to its Mine Ban Treaty deadline, one 
submitted in March 2015 for five years until 1 June 2020,89 and a second in 2019 for the 
period 2020–2025.90 Ethiopia provided several reasons for failing to comply with its Article 5 
deadlines, including insecurity; the lack of services and infrastructure necessary for demining 
operations; continuous redeployment of demining teams in scattered mined areas; the lack 
of precise information on the number and location of mined areas; and the identification 
of additional hazardous areas.91 The 2019 extension request also cites insufficient donor 
funding as a key challenge to achieving the Article 5 commitment.92 The cost of meeting the 
Article 5 deadline is estimated by Ethiopia to be $40,958,157, six million less than the first 
extension request.93
80 Statement of Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 30 November 2009.
81 UK, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018.
82 Argentina, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 March 2019.
83 Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 6.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. 7. Cambodia is considering deploying Royal Cambodian Army soldiers to meet this need, p. 9.
86 Ibid., p. 55. This figure does not include an additional US$8.1 million for clearance of antivehicle mines; 
$38.6 million for management and coordination; $118.9 million for cluster munitions clearance; or $41.3 
million for ERW clearance. The total sum is $372.2 million.
87 Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 April 2019.
88 NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 30; “Tchad: grève 
des démineurs restés 10 mois sans salaire” (“Chad: deminers strike after 10 months without pay”), Agence 
de Presse Africaine, 10 May 2017, http://apanews.net/fr/news/tchad-greve-des-demineurs-restes-10-mois-
sans-salaire; and email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2017.
89 Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, p. 10.
90 Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019.
91 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
92 Ibid., pp. 9, 14–15.

















Tajikistan: Tajikistan submitted its second Article 5 deadline extension request in March 
2019. The request is for an additional six years until 2025. The reasons given for not meeting 
its original 2020 deadline included insecurity along its border with Afghanistan and lack 
of permission to conduct demining in some of the western districts. Mined areas were 
reported as difficult to access and minefield records of poor quality.94 Tajikistan also reported 
that survey work along the Tajik-Afghan border between 2010 and 2018 had identified an 
additional 41 mined areas (a total of 10.48km²), which had impeded progress towards the 
achievement of its Article 5 commitments.95 The average clearance projected for each of 
the six years of the extension until 2020 is 1.5km² per year,96 although in the last five years 
Tajikistan has cleared only 2.61km² of mined area. The preliminary estimated cost for the 
six-year extension until 2025 was $30 million, not including a $480,000 contribution from 
the Tajikistan state budget.97
Yemen: Yemen became a State Party in 1999 and has since had two five-year extensions 
to its deadline to meet its Article 5 obligation. Since April 2015, an escalation in conflict has 
disrupted clearance activity and shifted priorities to the emergency clearance of mines and 
ERW.98 In March 2019, Yemen submitted a request for a third extension until 1 March 2023. 
Drawn up in consultation with UN Development Programme (UNDP), the request proposes 
an interim emergency response with the aim to conduct a national contamination survey 
in areas where security permits, to provide a realistic baseline for a subsequent 10-year 
extension request.99 In addition to conducting the baseline, the Yemen Executive Mine Action 
Center (YEMAC) also aims to produce a revised workplan to meet its Article 5 obligation; to 
revise the national standards and strengthen the information management system; and to 






CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVING 
CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS
Considerable progress has been made since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, 
but there is still a need to increase the pace of survey and clearance activities to meet Article 
5 obligations as soon as possible and to ensure significant progress towards the ambition of 
a mine-free world by 2025. There are still a number of challenges to be addressed by States 
Parties, but also opportunities that can assist States Parties to complete their obligations. 
FUNDING
Several mine-affected countries are facing significant funding shortfalls, hampering their 
ability to meet their Article 5 deadline obligations. In the last five years, inadequate funding 
has been cited as a challenge by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, 
94 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018; and interview, in Dushanbe, 30 May 2018, 
quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
95 Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 37; and Tajikistan 
answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 5 
Implementation, 2019, p. 1.
96 Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 8.
97 Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, pp. 9 and 23. 
98 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 3.
99 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, pp. 4 and 5.
100 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 August 2019, p. 25.
 Eritrea: Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 1 February
2020, but as of September 2019 it had yet to submit an extension request. It will be in
violation of the treaty as of 1 February 2020 if it fails to submit a request for approval by
States Parties at the November 2019 Review Conference in Oslo. Eritrea has not submitted
an Article 7 transparency report since 2014 and failed to submit an updated Article 5
workplan as required by States Parties when granting its second deadline extension.
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Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
and Zimbabwe.
Reasons cited for the lack of funding for some countries include funding being prioritized 
for countries with new emergencies rather than legacy contamination and a reduction in 
funding to countries that have achieved or are close to reaching middle-income status.101 
In the past, Serbia has reported that mine clearance operations were affected when donor 
funding transferred to cluster munition clearance.102 DRC has found mine action funding 
affected by the prioritization of funds for other humanitarian emergencies, including the 
recent Ebola outbreak. 103
As the majority of funding comes from just a few donors, the top five being the United 
States (US), the European Union (EU), the UK, Norway, and Germany,104 the loss of funding 
from a donor can dramatically impact a country’s mine action program. For example, Angola 
faced a reduction in funding for its mine action program following the loss of EU funding in 
2016105 and US funding in April 2018.106
Most States Parties do contribute an annual budget towards the cost of demining activities, 
although this is rarely enough to support their full mine action program. Government funds 
are often allocated to particular aspects of the demining program, particularly institutional 
support and salaries. The government of Angola has provided significant funding for mine 
clearance, although this has been almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects. 
A few States Parties cover the full costs of mine action. Peru, in its revised second extension 
request, submitted in August 2016, estimated that US$38.6 million would be needed to 
complete clearance, all of which was due to be funded by the Peruvian government.107 
However, Peru also reported that while $3.88 million had been costed for 2018, the actual 
amount set in the annual budget was $2.36 million.108
BORDER CONTROL AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
Several States Parties have stated that meeting their Article 5 deadlines is contingent on 
agreement around borders and territorial control. 
A large proportion of mine contamination affects disputed areas along state borders, 
and a lack of agreement between states has hindered survey and clearance operations. For 
example, the current estimation of CHAs and SHAs in Ethiopia does not include information 
on contamination in the border areas between Ethiopia and Eritrea due to a lack of border 
demarcation preventing access and survey.109 The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 
was terminated in 2008 and all mine action activities ceased. Ethiopia’s 2018 extension 
request notes that Ethiopia expects the discussion regarding the border areas will continue 
with the establishment of a joint border commission, although no indication was given as to 
when this will be established.110
101 Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, “State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment,” MAG and HALO 
Trust, December 2017, p. 8. 
102 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, p. 11.
103 NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 116.
104 See the Landmine Monitor chapter on Mine Action Support.
105 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from 
Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 
2018; and Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, “State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment,” MAG 
and HALO Trust, December 2017.
106 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from 
Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
107 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), July 2016, p. 18.
108 Peru, Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 11.
109 Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 34.

















Tajikistan’s ability to meet its new deadline partly rests 
on agreement of border clearance with Afghanistan and 
Uzbekistan. Tajikistan notes that both states have agreed 
for a joint commission to investigate the minefields and 
schedule clearance, but they are unable to provide an 
exact timetable.111 Negotiations are also occurring with 
Afghanistan and border forces regarding access to and 
security for survey and clearance in some of the border 
areas.
The border between Thailand and Cambodia is still 
heavily contaminated and much of it has been subject 
to demarcation dispute, preventing effective clearance 
by either state. Both states have cited this as an obstacle 
to achieving their Article 5 deadline. However, in recent 
years, Cambodia and Thailand have come to agreement 
regarding their cooperation on the survey and clearance 
of these areas.112
There have been other positive developments among States Parties to agree clearance 
along their borders. Croatia signed an agreement with Hungary in 2016 to demine the 
border as part of a cross-border cooperation project with some of this clearance completed 
in 2017. In 2000, Ecuador and Peru established the Binational Cooperation Program 
(Programa Binacional de Cooperación), and a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining 
was adopted in 2013 to unify the demining procedures of both states in accordance with 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The Ecuador-Peru Binational Demining Unit 
will carry out clearance of minefields along the border area, although the workplans of each 
country are slightly contradictory as to the amount of land to be cleared and when this will 
be done.113
In several states, clearance of landmines is impeded due to disputes over territorial 
control. While Cyprus stated in July 2013 that there were no remaining minefields in 
territories under its effective control,114 landmine contamination remains in the buffer zone 
and in the Turkish-controlled areas. The breakdown of settlement talks facilitated by the 
UN in July 2017 resulted in access to SHAs being denied to the UN-supported mine action 
operations in Cyprus.115 Turkey, which has mines along its borders with Syria, Armenia, Iran, 
Iraq, and Azerbaijan has only made marginal progress in addressing mine contamination in 
its territories, and its most recent extension request in 2013 does not include the clearance 
of mines in Northern Cyprus. 
Mine action in Palestine is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas according to civil and 
security control of Palestine and Israel. Most minefields are in Area C, where Israel has full 
civil and security control and will not authorize clearance by Palestinians.116
Ukraine also reported in its first Article 5 deadline extension request that it did not have 
access to some of the mined areas due to the occupying authority of the Russian Federation, 
111 Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 
5 Implementation, 2019, p. 5.
112 “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” The Phnom Penh Post, 24 September 2019, 
http://bit.ly/2pRUu9t; and Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 44.
113 Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional information, 8 September 2017, 
p. 10; and Peru, Updated National Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2024, May 2018, p. 17.
114 Cyprus, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form C, p. 4.
115 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. Pearce, 
UNFICYP), 10 September 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
116 State of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (voluntary report for period 1 August 2012–31 July 
2013), p. 10.
An NPA multi-task team clearing a minefield 
surrounded by tobacco plantations in Lebanon.
©NPA, June 2019
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which also prevented survey to understand the scale of contamination.117 Argentina reports 
that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/
Malvinas and has argued that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not 
had access to the islands.
CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT
Mine action has typically occurred in post-conflict situations, but protracted conflict is 
increasingly resulting in mine action taking place in complex, insecure contexts that restricts 
or prevents access to areas, slows progress, and endangers the lives of deminers and other 
mine action staff.
In 2018–2019, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties: Afghanistan, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
Insecurity restricted access to some areas that are or may be affected by antipersonnel mines 
in States Parties Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
Security and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan have affected clearance operations, slowing 
down and sometimes halting the progress of mine clearance.118 Some provinces are 
inaccessible to mine action operators due to ongoing conflict between the government, the 
Taliban and other armed groups. In other areas, demining teams must gain the consent of 
all relevant parties. 
In Colombia, the armed actions by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN), and drug-trafficking groups impact the ability for humanitarian 
demining groups to conduct survey and clearance.119 Humanitarian demining operators had 
vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in the suspension 
of operations. 
Ongoing conflict in Yemen means that the national contamination survey outlined in its 
2019 extension request can only be conducted in areas where security permits.120
In the last five years, there have been several cases of humanitarian deminers killed, 
injured, or taken hostage in conflict-related attacks. In Afghanistan, 14 security incidents were 
reported in 2017, including a deminer murdered by anti-government elements in Nangarhar 
province in September. A total of 97 staff were abducted but later returned. Operators also 
reported equipment losses, including detectors, VHF radios, and mobile phones.121 In 2018, 
six deminers were killed and 18 injured as a result of security incidents.122
In South Sudan, the release of mined areas plummeted in 2017 largely due to security 
concerns from the ongoing conflict, which significantly impeded mine action operations 
during the year. Four mine action personnel were seriously injured in an ambush, and there 
were several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups.
However, despite ongoing conflict and insecurity, States Parties have also been able to 
make progress. In Iraq, operations have been undertaken to tackle the massive contamination 
117 Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.
118 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2012, p. 7.
119 International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and Mine 
Action Review interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, in Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with 
Esteban Rueda and Sergio Mahecha, NPA, in Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker and Emily 
Chrystie, HALO Trust, in San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Charles Cagua Zambrano and 
Francisco Profeta Cardoso, CCCM, in Centro Poblado de Santo Domingo, 11 August 2018.
120 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2019, pp. 4 and 5.
121 Statement of UNMAS/DMAC, “UNMAS Afghanistan and DMAC strongly condemn brutal murder of an 
Afghan deminer in Nangarhar,” 12 September 2017. UNAMA reported three humanitarian deminers killed 
and one injured in conflict-related attacks. See, UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018.

















by improvised mines and other ERW found in areas recaptured from NSAG Islamic State. 
Yemen has focused on emergency clearance and mine risk education since the outbreak of 
conflict in 2015, and plans to embark on a national contamination survey to re-assess the 
extent of the problem in the country.
In states like Iraq and Colombia where recent conflict has created fear, insecurity, and 
mistrust in government or outside groups, mine action operators have increasingly drawn on 
community liaison as part of their mine action approach to build community understanding 
of operations and enable access to affected areas. 
IMPROVISED MINES AND OTHER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES
The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has dramatically increased in conflict areas in 
recent years, particularly in areas where insurgent forces are fighting. When victim-activated, 
these devices are also known as improvised mines or mines of an improvised nature. IEDs 
are often designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and so 
meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine and fall under the Mine Ban Treaty. 
States Parties have several obligations with regards to improvised antipersonnel mines. 
This includes reporting any confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination in 
their Article 7 transparency reports, making resources available to assess the extent of 
contamination, and to developing appropriate strategies to address it. States Parties are 
also required to exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing 
improvised mines. Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the costs of 
equipment and resources needed to deal with improvised mines, which may be higher than 
dealing with factory-manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress 
towards meeting Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance 
with the Mine Ban Treaty. A report published in 2017 recommended that contamination 
by improvised mines needs to be included within existing information management and 
reporting structures to ensure its location and extent is captured and a systematic response 
is conducted.123
In the last five years, confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination and/
or incidents and casualties were reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, 
Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen, and states not 
party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.
Afghanistan issued a policy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) in May 2018 that 
set out a number of principles to be followed by implementing partners. The Afghanistan 
Department for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that improvised mines are now 
being surveyed as SHA or CHA and when entered into Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA) they are included as part of the Article 5 workplan.124 The extent of this 
new contamination has yet to be determined by survey, but preliminary estimates in 17 of 22 
affected provinces identified 152 hazards covering 228km2.
In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) introduced a national standard on IEDs 
in 2016 and is working with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) to update the standard to take into account the experience gained in tackling the 
dense contamination of improvised devices in areas liberated from Islamic State since 2016. 
However, it was not included in Iraq’s 2018 Article 5 deadline extension request or in its 
Article 7 report for 2017. Iraq must consider improvised mine contamination as part of its 
Mine Ban Treaty obligations.
123 Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, “Policy Brief: The Ottawa Treaty’s 2025 Goal for Clearance,” MAG and 
HALO Trust, 2018, p. 12.
124 Email from Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi Abdul Qudos Ziaee and Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 29 August 
2019.
44 
ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE, AND TOPOGRAPHY
Several States Parties face the challenge of undertaking mine clearance in difficult 
environments which can slow the pace of clearance and increase costs. 
In some countries, mine clearance has been prioritized in populated and more accessible 
areas, leaving the more remote and challenging areas to be tackled last. Chile is moving 
into the final phase of operations but has stated that it will face considerable challenges to 
clearance of the remaining contamination due to climate and topography. The mined areas in 
the Altiplano and the Austral Islands are difficult to access and are subject to heavy rains and 
snow, which restrict the length of the demining season.125 At the beginning of operations in 
the Falkland Islands/Malvinas the UK prioritized the clearance of areas closest to settlements 
and civilian infrastructure, resulting in the release of areas closest to Port Stanley. The 
remaining minefields, cleared from 2018 onwards are particularly environmentally sensitive 
and challenging to clear due to penguin breeding areas and beach and sand dune areas.126 
The UK has therefore increased its funding commitment for this phase up to £27 million 
compared to the £11 million for the first four stages.127
In addition to the challenges of conducting clearance in remote and environmentally 
sensitive areas, there has been increasing use of IEDs in highly populated urban environments, 
the extent of which is creating new challenges for States Parties and mine action operators. 
In Iraq, Islamic State used improvised mines and booby-traps extensively in urban areas such 
as Mosul. Survey and clearance work in three-dimensional operating environments where 
the boundary between safe and unsafe areas is often less clear is challenging. In addition, 
the contamination in Iraq is often buried in building rubble resulting from heavy coalition 
airstrikes, which further complicates survey and clearance. 
Natural disasters have also impacted on the progress of a few States Parties towards 
meeting their clearance obligations. Ecuador submitted a second request to extend its mine 
clearance deadline for three months until 31 December 2017 due to a serious earthquake 
on 16 April 2016, which required the diversion of the armed forces away from demining.128
SURVEY AND LAND RELEASE
The resources for responding to landmine contamination are costly and limited and make it 
important to ensure that assets are deployed to achieve as much as possible. A major part 
of this is understanding where landmines are and where they are not. Under Article 5, States 
Parties are required to “make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control 
in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.” However, identifying 
the true extent of contamination has been problematic for many States Parties. 
The first global effort to understand the extent of contamination through the 
implementation of Landmine Impact Surveys was identified as bringing a more collaborative 
and deliberative approach and producing reports, databases, and outputs providing a more 
accurate description and analysis of the mine/unexploded ordinance (UXO) problems, thus 
providing a better basis for mine action decisions.129 However, in many countries the surveys 
were also found to greatly over-estimate the extent of contamination. In addition, the 
125 Email from Col. Andres Caceres Cuadra, CNAD, 12 July 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the 
Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
126 Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July 2017, quoted in Mine Action 
Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension 
Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 11.
127 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 10.
128 Letter from Efraín Baus Palacios, Director of Neighborhood Relations and Sovereignty, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Human Mobility, President of the National Humanitarian Demining Center of Ecuador, to Amb. 
Patricia O’Brian, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN in Geneva, and Chair of the Article 5 
Committee, Note No. 14839-DRVS/CENDESMI, Quito, 26 November 2016.


















systems to reduce SHAs were often over-cautious and wasteful, with an average of less than 
3% of cleared land containing mines or UXO.130
The introduction of evidence-based decision-making processes through a combination 
of non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance has greatly contributed toward 
increasing understanding of contamination and enabling more land to be released through 
cancelation and reduction, allowing for clearance resources to be targeted to land that is 
known to contain landmines.
Almost all States Parties that implement systematic mine clearance programs today 
now use land release methodologies (survey and clearance). This has led to significant 
advancement in understanding the actual extent of contamination, the cancelation or 
release of large areas of land previously considered contaminated, and better estimates of 
clearance timelines. For example:
  In Angola, survey was conducted in the lead up to the development of its 2017 
extension request. All 18 provinces are now reported as surveyed and the process 
of non-technical survey allowed for significant cancelation, by as much as 90%, 
to the areas recorded in the database of the National Intersectoral Commission 
for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de 
Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH).131
  In Cambodia, analysis of the data from 2014–2016 from the Cambodian Mine Action 
Authority (CMAA) national database showed that 40% of land was released through 
non-technical survey and 60% through technical survey and clearance.132
  Between 2014 and 2018, Croatia released 90.4km² of previously suspected land 
through survey. Croatia plans to further reduce SHA in the period 2019–2026.133
  South Sudan’s national mine action program has improved the accuracy of its 
estimates of contamination from landmines and other ERW since 2018. Re-survey of 
contaminated areas combined with an improvement in security conditions in certain 
areas and an overhaul of the mine action database contributed to the reduction of 
contamination from 89km² reported at the start of 2018, to 39.4km² at the end of 
the year. 
  In Sri Lanka, non-technical survey began in June 2015 and was completed in February 
2017. The estimates of total contamination have fallen sharply: from 506km² at the 
end of 2010, to 98km² at the end of 2012, to nearly 68.4km² in 2015, and down to 
just under 24km2 as of April 2019.134
  In 2012, land release methodology was introduced in Thailand, which has allowed 
the accelerated release of safe land. Thailand estimates that at the time of its Article 
5 extension request in March 2017, it had released around 80% of the total reported 
contamination.135
  Non-technical survey in Zimbabwe between 2013 and 2016 resulted in the 
cancelation of around 93% of SHAs.136 Zimbabwe has reported that having completed 
survey, efforts are now focused on clearance. Zimbabwe is likely to meet its Article 5 
deadline obligations by 2025.
In some States Parties, plans are underway to increase the use of land release approaches. 
In BiH, a country-wide assessment is to be conducted in 2018–2019 to establish a more 
accurate baseline of mine contamination and help to improve the efficiency of follow on 
survey and clearance operations. It is not clear if this has started.
130 ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World, www.the-monitor.org/LMM2008.
131 Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 August 2017, p. 5. 
132 CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025,” p. 9.
133 Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Croatia, 20 September 2019. Land release was 
as follows: 2014: 46.2km²; 2015: 27.1km²; 2016: 3.3km²; 2017: 6.6km²; and 2018: 7.2km².
134 Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 9.
135 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, p. 4.
136 Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 41.
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The extent of contamination in both 
Ethiopia and Ukraine is currently extensive 
and it is expected that in both cases the SHA 
will be reduced through survey. In Ethiopia, it is 
expected that only about 2% of SHA will contain 
mines once survey is conducted.137
However, most States Parties still do not 
have a clear understanding of the full extent of 
their remaining contamination. The Committee 
on Article 5 Implementation assessed the 
degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, 
finding that only seven of the 25 States Parties 
assessed had provided a high degree of clarity 
in their reporting: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
The Maputo Action Plan makes specific reference 
to cooperation and partnership and that States 
Parties should take greater ownership over their responsibilities, including national funding 
and management of mine action programs.
Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program 
or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations with a few 
exceptions:
  In Cyprus the mine action program has been coordinated by the UN Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).138
  In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management 
Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation 
that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament 
and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget. In July 
2018, SEMA reported that it was lobbying to get the necessary legislation passed 
in parliament and that once approved, SEMA would have a dedicated budget line 
included in the national budget.139
  In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) 
will ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, this has not 
yet occurred. This appears to be a result of financial and technical limitations of 
the NMAA that prevented effective management of operations and a change in 
the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted capacity-building 
of government institutions. However, in March 2019, UNMAS reported that it is 
preparing to transfer management and coordination responsibility to the NMAA.140
  In Ukraine, a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action 
authority and center is being developed with support from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Project-Coordinator and the GICHD. 
137 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 10 and 35. However, Ethiopia 
has reported different estimates of the percentage of SHAs expected to be confirmed, between 0.5% and 
3%. See the Revised National Mine Action Plan for 2017–2020, October 2017, pp. 1–3, & 9; statement 
of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 
June 2017; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 
5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 7 and 42. 
138 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Stefan De Coninck, UNMAS, and Maj. 
Peace, UNFICYP), 10 September 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing the Mines 2018,” 1 October 
2018.
139 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form J. 
140 UNMAS, “Programmes: South Sudan,” updated March 2019, www.unmas.org/en/programmes/southsudan.
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The donors have agreed to an extension of the project until the end of 2018, due 
to delays in the adoption of the mine action law.141 This project has now received 
funding until October 2020.142
  In Yemen, YEMAC has been split due to the conflict, with one part based in Sanaa 
under the control of the Houthi armed movement and the other part in the southern 
city of Aden under the control of the Adrabbuh Mansur-led Yemeni government, 
supported by the Saudi and UAE-led coalition. The Sanaa office coordinates 
operations in the north and center of the country, while the Aden office oversees 
operations in southern provinces.
States Parties Nigeria and Oman do not have national mine action programs.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND STANDARDS
Since 1999, the GICHD has supported the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has 
supported States Parties to work towards the fulfillment of their Article 5 treaty-mandated 
obligations by providing capacity development and technical support in developing mine 
action strategies and plans; in implementing more effective and efficient land release 
processes; in managing mine action data through the use of the IMSMA; and in incorporating 
gender and diversity considerations into mine action programs. 
The GICHD has supported UNMAS in managing the development and review of the IMAS, 
which have provided guidance and defined international requirements and specifications for 
mine action operations, enabling mine action programs globally to improve their safety and 
efficiency and to develop national mine action standards that reflect specific local realities 
and conditions.
The IMAS and the support from GICHD and its partners have supported States Parties 
(and some states not party) to improve and professionalize their mine action programs. 
It has also contributed towards greater consistency and accuracy in the reporting of land 
release targets and classifications as required in the Article 7 transparency reports. Most 
States Parties (26) have national mine action standards in place. Serbia and the UK both use 
IMAS, and DRC, Niger, and Ukraine have standards that are being reviewed or drafted. At least 
19 States Parties use a version of IMSMA, and at least 25 States Parties have mine action 
strategic plans and/or workplans in place.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLEARANCE TO SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
Mine Action was initially framed in meeting the basic security needs of people, although 
in the wake of the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), mine action is increasingly being considered not only in terms 
of its humanitarian contribution, but also in terms of its contribution to longer-term 
development and socio-economic recovery. Mine action reporting, which initially focused 
mainly on outputs in terms of mines cleared and amount of land cleared, has adopted a 
stronger focus on outcomes and impacts in terms of the contribution of mine action to 
livelihood improvement, socio-economic recovery, and longer-term development.143 There 
have also been efforts to ensure that mine clearance is prioritized to first meet the needs 
of the poorest and most vulnerable. In some States Parties, the mine action programs have 
spanned the years from an immediate post-war, humanitarian response to longer-term 
development.
141 “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project 
Coordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors 
and UN Advisors, 17 February 2016.
142 NPA, “The Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants,” 1 August 2019, p. 164.
143 GICHD and UNDP, “Leaving No One Behind. Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals,” Geneva, 
2017, p. 26.
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The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 SDGs were adopted by the 
UN Member States in January 2016. A study conducted by the GICHD and UNDP in 2017 
recommended that while country-specific areas of work such as mine action are not explicitly 
identified in the SDGs, they can be addressed through the national-level SDG adaptation 
processes.144 This can support States Parties in accelerating progress toward meeting treaty 
obligations, both in prioritizing mine action as a facilitator to meet the 2025 obligations and 
as a means to leverage funding.
Mine action-related activities have been integrated into national development plans, 
poverty reduction strategy papers, UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), 
or UNDP Country Programme documents by several countries.145 States Parties have also 
highlighted the importance of the link between mine action and broader development goals 
within their mine action strategies. For example:
  Afghanistan, in its National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020) 
has as its first goal the aim to facilitate development. This includes the sector 
improving understanding of how mine action contributes to human security and 
socio-economic development.146
  Cambodia adopted a specific SDG 18 to End the Negative Impact of Mines/ERW 
and Promote Victim Assistance. This includes the target to clear all identified mine 
and ERW-contaminated areas by the year 2030.147 Mine action is also tied in closely 
with local development plans through a local-level planning process. Targets and 
indicators are being developed by the CMAA in terms of the contribution of mine 
action to other SDGs, including eradicating poverty, achieving zero hunger, promoting 
good health, ensuring decent work, and reducing inequalities. CMAA is customizing 
its IMSMA and training staff on data collection and analysis that will include SDG-
related targets.
  Like Cambodia, state not party Lao PDR, also has an SDG specific to dealing with 
its ERW contamination problem. SDG 18, Lives Safe from UXO, recognizes the 
contribution of UXO clearance towards other SDGs, such as SDG 1, Ending Poverty.148
  Zimbabwe was supported by the GICHD to develop a National Resource Mobilization 
Strategy that will link mine action to the SDGs. ZIMAC plans to launch the strategy 
before the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.149
  The BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 recognizes the importance of 
linking mine action to the SDGs now that the country has moved on from the initial 
period of rehabilitation and stabilization following the conflict. The strategy commits 
to better understanding “the influences and possibilities brought by clearance in the 
sense of enabling both development and contribution to fulfilment of the SDGs,” and 
to the mobilization of funds for mine action.150
GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The importance of looking at gender and diversity in mine action has gained traction among 
States Parties in recent years. In relation to contamination and clearance, the consideration 
of gender and diversity is important in terms of the collection of information for planning 
and prioritization, in ensuring fair and equitable land release, and in paying attention to the 
gender balance on survey and clearance teams.151 This not only allows an inclusive approach 
to gender equality but also ensures that mine action has a greater and more inclusive impact.
144 Ibid., p. 52.
145 Ibid., p. 78.
146 Afghanistan, National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020), DMAC, 2016, p. 2.
147 Cambodia, “SDG 18: End the negative impact of Mine/ERW and promote victim assistance,” undated, 
www.csdgs.org/en/csdgs/goals/18.
148 Lao PDR, “SDG 18: Lives safe from UXO,” undated.
149 Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 33.
150 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 13.

















Several States Parties, particularly those with larger mine action programs, have included 
gender within their national mine action strategies. For example:
  Afghanistan has included gender and diversity as Goal 4 in its national mine action 
strategic plan with strategic objectives to develop a gender and diversity policy 
for the mine action program, to increase employment of women, persons with 
disabilities and other marginalized groups, to promote gender and diversity across 
management and coordination, and to undertake capacity-building and awareness-
raising regarding gender and diversity.152
  BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 also acknowledges the importance 
of considering gender in mine action planning, implementation, and follow-up. It 
states the need to ensure that all mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age. 
The strategy also refers to the 2033 Law on Gender Equality in BiH and the Gender 
Equality Action Plan that supports equal representation of men and women.153 
Importantly, the mine action strategy also notes that the members of the newly 
established Demining Commission from the ministries of civil affairs, security and 
defense are also from the three constitutive nations of BiH, representing the Bosniak, 
Croat, and Serb peoples.154
  Goal 8 within the Cambodia National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 includes the 
mainstreaming of gender and environmental protection in mine action.155 Cambodia 
approved its Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan for Mine Action (2018–2022) in 
2018.156
  The South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022 includes a section on 
gender and diversity, focusing on how different gender and age groups are affected 
by mines and ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities. Guidelines on 
mainstreaming gender considerations in mine action planning and operations in 
South Sudan are also incorporated in the strategy.157
  The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2019 of the DRC also includes a section 
of gender.
  The Tajikistan Mine Action Center has a National Gender Strategy.
There is evidence that some of the commitments towards gender and diversity outlined 
in the national strategies are being implemented. For example, the first all-women mine 
clearance team was established in Afghanistan in 2018.158 However, while women are being 
recruited to clearance teams, there is less evidence of them being recruited to managerial 
and supervisory positions in the sector. In the DRC, it was reported that around 30% of 
operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female in 2019, but only around 7% of 
the managerial and supervisory positions were held by women.159 In comparison, Tajikistan 
reported that it is a challenge to maintain a gender balance in demining teams due to those 
serving in the military being predominantly men. Tajikistan aimed to recruit more women to 
other roles, such as paramedics and quality management, in addition to increasing female 
civilian capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.160
Gender and diversity still appear not to be a priority for some States Parties. Gender is not 
referenced in Angola’s 2019–2025 Mine Ban Treaty Mine Action workplan, nor is it included 
152 Afghanistan, National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395–1399 (2016–2020), DMAC, 2016, p. 6. 
153 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 13.
154 Ibid.
155 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 7.
156 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2019, p. 33.
157 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018, quoted in Mine Action Review, “Clearing 
the Mines 2018,” 1 October 2018.
158 NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 14.
159 Ibid., p. 116.
160 Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 
5 Implementation, 2019, p. 6.
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in its national mine action standards in place in 2018.161 In some countries, the utilization 
of military staff for demining operations also seems to limit the number of women in the 
sector. A report by the GICHD in 2012 noted that most of the staff of the Ethiopian Mine 
Action Office (EMAO) was transferred from the Ministry of National Defence and included 
a limited number of women. The report also noted that EMAO considered demining work 
not to be suitable for women.162 While the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) 
has a National Gender Strategy, it acknowledges that it is a challenge to maintain a gender 
balance in demining teams due to those serving in the military being predominantly men. 
However, Tajikistan noted that efforts would be made to recruit women to roles such as 
paramedics and quality management, in addition to increasing female civilian capacity in 
coordination with other implementing partners.163
RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
States that have complied with their Article 5 obligations and made all reasonable efforts 
to identify and clear all remaining mine contamination, may still find residual, previously 
unknown contamination at a later date. To ensure compliance with Article 5, States Parties 
have agreed to address these areas in accordance with the commitments made at the Twelfth 
Meeting of States Parties.164 These commitments are as follows:
  To immediately inform all States Parties if a mined area or newly mined area is found 
and to destroy all the antipersonnel mines in the mined areas as soon as possible.
  To submit a request for an extended deadline, which should be as short as possible 
and no more than 10 years, if unable to destroy all the antipersonnel mines before 
the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference.
  To continue reporting obligations under Article 7 of the treaty and to provide all 
other relevant updates.
Several States Parties found such residual contamination after declaring completion. 
Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Mozambique all addressed and completed their 
obligations under Article 5. Algeria continues to find isolated mines which it clears within 
the year and so is considered to be compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. 
National strategies and completion plans need to make provisions for sustainable national 
capacity to address any previously unknown areas. Several States Parties have begun to plan 
for the possibility of having to deal with residual contamination following the completion 
of their Article 5 obligations.
  The BiH National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 includes a section on management 
of residual contamination and national capacities. It specifies that the armed forces 
of BiH and the Administrations for Civil Protection will play a role in this, and that a 
strategy for dealing with the residual threat should be created by 2022.165
  Goal 7 of the Cambodia National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 aims to establish 
national capacity to address residual mine threats after 2025. This includes 
strengthening national capacity, including the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, 
Cambodian Mine Action Center, and the police; enhancing and sharing mine action 
knowledge within the sector and beyond; and reviewing the legal, institutional, and 
operational framework to address residual threats.166
161 NPA, “Mine Action Review: Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019,” 1 August 2019, p. 111.
162 GICHD, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Ethiopia,” Geneva, March 2012, p. 8.
163 Tajikistan answers to the questions concerning the request submitted by Tajikistan, Committee on Article 
5 Implementation, 2019, p. 6.
164 Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines 
have passed. Submitted by Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance (Indonesia and 
Zambia), Geneva, 26 November 2012, http://bit.ly/2NtkAI3.
165 BiH, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 33.
166 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 14.

A White Helmets team provided risk education to 81 boys and 59 girls at a school in 
Hama Governorate, Syria










Antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, including improvised landmine types, unexploded 
cluster submunitions,1 and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—
remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm.
Following a sharp rise in casualties due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015, 
high numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2018. A total of at least 6,897 people 
were killed or injured by mines/ERW in the calendar year. Of that total, at least 3,059 people 
were killed, and another 3,837 people were injured; for one casualty it was not known if the 
person survived or was killed.2
Although the 2018 total was less than those of the three previous years, it was still 
almost double the lowest determined annual number of 3,457 casualties in 2013.
It is certain that numerous casualties went unrecorded. Some of the most mine/ERW-
affected countries do not have national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other 
forms of adequate reporting exist. In some conflict-affected counties combined numbers were 
reported without the granularity of data needed so that it can be adequately disaggregated 
and used.
For the third consecutive year, in 2018, the highest number of annual casualties was 
caused by improvised mines (3,789). This was also the year with the most improvised mine 
casualties recorded to date.
1 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. 
Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are 
reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused 
by cluster munitions see, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, www.the-monitor.org/CMM2015/
VictimAssistance.
2 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted 
as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor mine/ERW 
casualty database.
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Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty 
are indicated in bold.
Civilians represented the majority of casualties compared to military and security forces,3 
continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption of the 
Mine Ban Treaty: 71% of casualties were civilians in 2018 where the status was known. This 
represented a decrease in the percentage of civilian casualties from 87% in 2017 and around 
80% in recent years.4
Mine/ERW casualties annually (1999–2018) 
In 1999, on average there was more than one mine/ERW casualty occurring each hour.5 In 
2014, at the time of the Maputo Action Plan, the casualty total had dropped significantly and 
the Monitor recorded an average of about 10 casualties per day. 
However, in 2018, the rate was nearly double that, at just below 
20 casualties per day.
Since the first years of the Mine Ban Treaty, it was certain that 
many casualties went unrecorded. In 1999, the Monitor identified 
some 9,000 casualties, but country estimates indicated that 
there were another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties that were 
not recorded in the available data. From 1999 through 2006, 
the number of new mine casualties (recorded and estimated 
calculated together) each year was between 15,000 and 20,000. 
For each year between 2009 and 2014, the Monitor estimated 
that there have been approximately 1,000 additional casualties 
(in the range of an additional 20–30% of the recorded total) 
that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics. 
Subsequently, due to the highly irregular accessibility of data 
for countries experiencing conflict after 2014, estimating 
the gaps has become less feasible, even where some country 
estimates are available.
The global casualties total since 1999 has increased every 
reporting year due to new casualties recorded and also to the 
3 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as 
members of non-state armed groups and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct 
participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international 
humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between 
combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for 
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & 
answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.
4 Civilian casualties were recorded at 70% both in 2011 and 2009.





















































updating of historical data with newly available statistics. More than 130,000 casualties 
have been recorded by Landmine Monitor just in the period since 1999.6
The significant increase in recorded casualties since 2014 is primarily due to large 
numbers of casualties in relatively few countries with intensive armed conflict—including 
Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as Myanmar. However, there is a clear 
overall trend of declining casualty numbers in most countries since the Mine Ban Treaty 
entered into force in 1999. This includes large reductions in casualties from the worst peak 
years in Cambodia (1,153 casualties in 1999) and Colombia (1,229 casualties in 2006).
Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised 
mine casualties. In Monitor casualty reporting, the term “improvised mines” is synonymous 
with victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive 
weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated 
IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These 
are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), and booby-
traps or are described by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate 
IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush-wire IEDs. Improvised antipersonnel mines that are detonated by 
the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
The most improvised mine casualties recorded to date (3,789) was in 2018. To put the 
impact of this manifestation into perspective: for 2018, the number of improvised mine 
casualties alone was higher than the total number of casualties caused by all mine varieties 
(including improvised mines and all various unexploded ordnance) in the year with the least 
recorded casualties (3,475 in 2013).
Since 2005, the country with the most recorded improvised mine casualties each year 
has also had the greatest number of total annual casualties. In 2018, Afghanistan had the 
most recorded improvised mine casualties of all countries (1,586), followed by Syria (1,076). 
For the entire period since 1999, the greatest number of improvised mine casualties were 
recorded in Colombia (10,428), followed by Afghanistan (8,422). 
Improvised mine casualties in Colombia since 1999
Improvised mine casualties in Afghanistan since 1999 (first recorded 
for 2006)





















































The country with the most recorded total casualties in 2018 was State Party Afghanistan, 
with 2,234, followed by state not party Syria, with 1,465 casualties reported. Mine/ERW 
casualties were identified in a total of 50 states and other areas in 2018.7
Of the total recorded casualties in 2018, two-thirds (4,543 or 66%) occurred in 32 States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.8
CASUALTY RECORDING FOR 2018
The 6,897 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2018 only 
include recorded casualties, not estimates of casualties.9 It 
is certain that there are additional casualties each year that 
are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty 
statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and 
those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, numerous 
casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is 
likely significantly higher in those countries.
In Afghanistan, data collection was affected by conflict and 
coverage declined due to the national Red Crescent Society 
no longer conducting casualty survey. Reporting of military 
casualties was generally rare in past years. After May 2017, 
the Afghan military stopped releasing its conflict casualty 
figures completely. However, more armed forces and non-state 
armed group (NSAG) casualties were recorded by the Monitor 
in 2018 than in previous years from other sources.10 Monitor 
casualty data for 2018 includes 1,435 casualties recorded by 
Afghanistan’s Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) 
and another 799, mostly military casualties, from analysis of 
casualties documented in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) 
compilation of media coverage of conflict incidents.11 The United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported attributing an increase in mine/ERW casualty numbers in 
2018 “to ‘new contamination’ by anti-personnel weapons in the country, linked to intensifying 
conflict.”12
7 In 2018, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and three other 
areas Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
8 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2018: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, 
Bangladesh, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
9 The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, and global, dataset of 
casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2018 included datasets or reporting from the following 
types of sources: international organizations, conflict tracking databases, UN and national mine action centers, other 
UN agencies, humanitarian mine action operators, ICBL members, and other NGOs, as well as media scanning.
10 Additionally, in 2018 the Monitor again began including casualties among NSAG forces emplacing 
improvised mines. These had previously been excluded due to the likelihood that the emplaced explosive 
item causing the accidental explosion was a command-denotated IED. However, by 2018, there was less 
distinction between incidents of NSAGs as casualties of their own minefields or laying the improvised 
mines, and more indications that accidents involved laying trigger-sensitive improvised mines.
11 Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2018. 
Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing 
ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660. 
12 “Rising landmine blast toll in Afghanistan highlights long-term care needs of survivors,” UN News, 6 
February 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032141.
States with the most recorded 












Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty 








The Monitor identified 1,465 mine/ERW casualties in Syria from multiple sources for 
2018, which is a decrease from 1,906 in 2017.13 However, since the conflict began in 2011, 
annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. Casualty 
totals have fluctuated in part due to inconsistent availability of data and sources. There are 
many people recorded as dead compared to those injured. Therefore, it is certain, based on 
the probable proportion of fatalities to people injured, that the actual number of casualties 
occurring in Syria in 2018, as in past years, was substantially higher than the annual total 
recorded.14
The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the effective operation of a national casualty 
surveillance mechanism. Yemen reported that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center 
(YEMAC) information management system has become outdated and is currently not usable. 
Furthermore, the conflict has presented new mines and mine-technologies (improvised 
mines), with which YEMAC has had no previous experience. This is compounded by the scale 
of the conflict and its extensive impact geographically in the country.15
The figures reported for mine/ERW casualties in Yemen differ widely, underlining the 
abovementioned challenge of collecting reliable data in a context of ongoing conflict. In 
both its Article 5 extension request and its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for 2018, Yemen 
informed States Parties of 1,087 casualties recorded in 2018 (967 men and 120 women), 
without noting the number of persons killed and injured or types of explosive items causing 
casualty incidents.16 The UN Humanitarian Response reporting observed that landmines 
caused the third most civilian casualties in 2018 in Yemen, despite a lower rate of incidents; 
reporting that 233 civilian casualties were the result of landmine incidents.17 Other UN 
reporting stated that mines/ERW caused 227 child casualties alone in Yemen in 2018.18 The 
Monitor total for 2018 is from multiple combined sources including other detailed data from 
YEMAC.
In Iraq, as in previous years, it is certain that there were many more mine/ERW casualties 
that occurred in 2018 that have not been identified. However, UN reporting indicates that 
there was a significant overall reduction in conflict-related casualties of all types, which 
may signal that the decrease in mine/ERW casualties since the reduction of recent conflict 
is part of a trend.19
Casualty data in Libya was not complete or comprehensive. It lacked key details, and 
data from 2018 was reportedly not yet entered into the national information management 
system.20
New information on casualties in Nigeria from 2016 through 2019 was recorded by Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), which significantly heightened understanding and awareness of the 
extent of the impact of mines/ERW, especially improvised mines, in that State Party.
13 Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
14 The Monitor recorded 933 people killed and 532 people injured in Syria in 2018, whereas generally only 
just over a quarter of all mine/ERW casualties will be fatalities.
15 Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9.
16 Ibid.; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018).
17 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Civilian Impact Monitoring Report: January—December 
2018,” p. 9, http://bit.ly/369Zmaw.
18 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General, Protection of civilians in armed conflict,” 7 May 
2019, para. 31, http://bit.ly/36be2Gs; and UN, “Inter-agency messaging for the Vienna Conference on 
Protecting Civilians in Urban Warfare,” 3 October 2019.
19 In December 2018, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that its “monitoring in recent months 
has shown a steady reduction in civilian casualties.” UNAMI decided to stop releasing civilian casualty 
updates on a monthly basis, but rather based on the circumstances.




There were at least 1,714 child casualties in 2018, which accounted for 40% of all casualties 
for whom the age group was known (4,310), but made up over half (54%) of civilians for 
whom the age group was known (3,088).22 Children were killed (582) or injured (1,132) by 
mines/ERW in 38 states and other areas in 2018.23 As in previous years, in 2018, the vast 
majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (84%).24 ERW caused most 
child casualties (871, or 51%). 
In 2018, men and boys made up the vast majority of all casualties, with 88% of all 
casualties for which the sex was known (4,162 of 4,709). Women and girls made up 12% of 
all casualties for which the sex was known (547).
Civilians represented 71% of casualties in 2018 where the civilian/military/deminer 
status was known (4,087 of 5,770); with 1,663 military casualties.25 The country with the most 
recorded military casualties of mines/ERW in 2018 was Afghanistan (642); followed by Syria 
(269), both with state soldiers and NSAG combatant casualties (including militia) recorded; 
and Mali (153) with national and international military (including peacekeeper forces). The 
total military casualties for 2018 represented the second highest number recorded other 
than 2008 (1,694) in any year since 1999.
In 2018, the Monitor identified 20 casualties among deminers in seven countries (four 
deminers were killed and 16 injured).26 Another 28 casualties (26 killed and two injured) were 
state military and NSAG personnel who were killed and injured while clearing, disarming, 
or dismantling mines in Syria. These were not included in the total of deminer casualties.27
MINE/ERW TYPES RESULTING IN CASUALTIES
Monitor casualty records include only mine/ERW casualties; people killed or injured in 
incidents involving explosive items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person or vehicle.28 Casualties from incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been 
caused by remotely detonated mines or IEDs—those that were not victim-activated—are 
not included. Mines/ERW therefore differs from the classification of explosive ordnance.29 
That is because the definition of explosive ordnance additionally includes devices that are 
21 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent 
that data is available and disaggregated.
22 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at the time of 
the incident. 
23 In 2018, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and two other areas, Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh.
24 There were 1,163 boys and 231 girls recorded as casualties in 2018; the sex of 320 child casualties was 
not recorded.
25 In 2018, military casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Western 
Sahara.
26 In 2018, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, China, Iran, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Turkey, 
and Yemen.
27 Also, a demining dog was killed in a mine explosion in Turkey.
28 Such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), and improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs.) AXO and UXO are collectively referred to 
as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW casualties. Not 
included in the totals are estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given.
29 International Mine Action Standards 04.10, “Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations” 
says 3.99. Explosive Ordnance (EO) (2018) “interpreted as encompassing mine action’s response to the 
following munitions: Mines, Cluster Munitions, Unexploded Ordnance, Abandoned Ordnance, Booby traps, 
Other devices (as defined by CCW APII), Improvised Explosive Devices.” Convention on Conventional 
Weapons Amended Protocol II, Article 2 - Definitions: ‘Other devices’ include “improvised explosive devices 








activated manually or by remote control.30 In practical terms for casualties reporting in 2018, 
for example, some 427 casualties of landmines or IEDs in Yemen, which were not clearly 
victim-activated, were excluded from the global dataset, as were hundreds of casualties 
recorded in Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and other countries impacted by improvised mines and 
emplaced IEDs.
In 2018, landmines of all types caused at least 4,885 casualties—these were recorded 
as being caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (332), improvised mines (3,789), 
antivehicle mines (394), and other unspecified mine types (370).
Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2018
As noted previously, improvised mines that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person, fit the definition of antipersonnel mines and are therefore prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. Of the total 3,789 improvised mine casualties recorded for 2018, 
at least 1,752 (46%) were reported specifically to be “antipersonnel mines” of an improvised 
nature.31 Only 204 (5%) of the total improvised mine casualties for 2018 (those recorded for 
Mali), were believed to be certain to act as “antivehicle mines”. The rest were not recorded 
specifically as to the mine type as the exact nature of the trigger mechanisms of improvised 
mines is often not reported in many countries; however, available information indicates 
that the fusing of most improvised mines causing casualties worldwide allows them to be 
activated by a person, thus effectively making them prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. 
For example, in Colombia antipersonnel mines are all of an improvised nature and in Ukraine 
most improvised antipersonnel mines recorded were tripwire-fitted hand grenades. In June 
2019, UNAMA stated that it “reiterates that victim-activated pressure plate IEDs [a common 
type of improvised mines in many countries] function like anti-personnel landmines, which 
are prohibited under the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines.”32
30 See the table in the Annex of this section.
31 The total of improvised antipersonnel mine casualties recorded in 2018 in Afghanistan (1,586), Colombia 
(150), and Ukraine (16).
32 UNAMA, “Midyear Update on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June 2019,” 30 











































Casualties from improvised mines were identified in 18 states in 2018.33 Most improvised 
mine casualties in 2018 occurred in Afghanistan (1,586) and Syria (1,076). Casualties recorded 
as caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (thus, not including improvised mines) were 
documented in 19 states and areas in 2018, four less than in 2017.34
In 2018, antivehicle mines were recorded as having caused at least 394 casualties in 
20 states and areas.35 The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from 
antivehicle mines were Yemen (154) and Mali (98).36 In both countries, factory-made 
antivehicle mines are also used in the construction of improvised mines, making it difficult to 
distinguish between these types from reporting, or disaggregate casualties by the explosive 
item responsible with a high level of certainty. Often, such modifications may make the mine 
effectively an antipersonnel device, because it can be triggered by a person. For example, 
it was claimed that Houthi (Ansar Allah) forces refitted antivehicle mines that originally 
required 100kgs of pressure to trigger a detonation, so that they could explode with a force 
of just 10kgs.37 Such modification often involves the addition of mechanisms to detonate the 
mines such as pressure plates or tripwires, which also increase the area coverage as well as 
the sensitivity of fusing. 
In Mali, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents recorded in 2018 and no casualties 
occurred while individuals were on foot, though 25 of the civilian casualties in Mali in 2018 
occurred in 10 incidents where they were on an animal-drawn cart.
Another 370 casualties were recorded under the category of other unspecified mine types 
in 18 states and areas.38
33 Not included among casualties recorded from factory-made antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or 
other unspecified types of mines. Casualties from improvised mines in 2018 occurred in Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Additionally, improvised mine casualties were known to have occurred in 
Myanmar, but these are undifferentiated from other mine casualties in data. Among sources used by the 
Monitor for calendar year 2018 data on improvised mine casualties, data from among the casualties of 
explosive incidents categorized as “victim-activated” in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive 
violence data set for 2018 was included. AOAV casualty data for 2018, provided by email from Jennifer 
Dathan, Researcher, AOAV, 15 March 2019; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Data project (ACLED) data for calendar year 2018. Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, 
Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal 
of Peace Research, Issue 47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.
34 In 2018, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, 
Cambodia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Zimbabwe, and other area Western Sahara.
35 In 2018, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Armenia, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
36 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-
vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 569 casualties from both confirmed and suspected 
antivehicle mines in 2018. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy 
Advisor, GICHD, 25 June 2019; and GICHD-SIPRI, “The humanitarian and developmental impact of anti-
vehicle mines: Global mapping and analysis of anti-vehicle mine incidents in 2018,” 2019, www.sipri.
org/sites/default/files/2019-08/avm-incident-report-2018.pdf. Monitor and GICHD-SIPRI methodologies 
used to enter data differ, resulting in the differences in annual casualties reported. The research scope of 
the AVM project was broadened in 2018, in order to better record incidents caused by antivehicle mines of 
an improvised nature. However, in Monitor reporting when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle 
mines and improvised mines in different sources, the Monitor sometimes included those as improvised 
mine casualties. Monitor reporting does include politically disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, 
and tends to use the definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible.
37 Project Masam: Saudi project for demining in Yemen, “Landmines are the gift of death to the Yemenis,” 
undated, www.projectmasam.com/eng/landmines-are-the-gift-of-death-to-the-yemenis.
38 In 2018, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chad, 









Unexploded submunitions caused 85 casualties.39 Where the age group was known 
(59), child casualties made up more than half (39, or 66%) of all casualties caused by 
unexploded cluster submunitions. 
Casualties caused by ERW numbered 1,410 in 32 states and areas in 2018.40 Of the 
annual total, 632 ERW casualties occurred in Afghanistan. In 2018, globally, children 
made up 69% (871) of ERW casualties, when the age group was recorded.
In 2018, a total of 517 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were 
either not specifically identified initially, were otherwise undifferentiated or remained 
unknown during casualty recording (such as hospital records), or were not disaggregated 
when recorded in data systems.41
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Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in bold; other areas in italics.
39 In 2018, unexploded submunition casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, 
South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Nagorno Karabakh. One additional casualty for 
Iraq was identified after Cluster Munition Monitor 2019 was published. For more information on 
casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded 
for the year 2018, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2019.
40 In 2018, ERW casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, 
Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and other 
areas Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
41 Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 




Mine/ERW types causing casualties
Category of mine/
ERW Term Description
Mines* Antipersonnel mines A munition designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person, 
and therefore prohibited under the Mine 
Ban Treaty.
Antivehicle mines Also referred to as “antitank mines,” 
and included among Mines Other Than 
Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), these 
are designed to be detonated by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle 
as opposed to that of a person and tend 
to contain a larger explosive charge than 
antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are 
not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty 
unless they are fitted with fuses that can 
be detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person.
Improvised mines Improvised mines are types of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are 
“homemade” explosive weapons that 
are designed to cause death or injury. 
Improvised mines are IEDs that are 
detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person or a vehicle. These are 
landmines and are sometimes referred to 
as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs 
(VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, 
such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs).
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including 
booby-traps (also included among 
“improvised mines”).**
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including 
booby-traps that can be detonated by 
the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person, fit the definition of antipersonnel 
landmines and are therefore prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap 
is an antipersonnel explosive device 
deliberately placed to cause casualties 
when an apparently harmless object 
is disturbed or a normally safe act is 
performed.
Other unspecified mine 
type
When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” 
incident, lacking other details regarding the 















Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or 
released by, or otherwise separated from, 
a cluster munition and failed to explode 
or that have not been used and that have 
been left behind or dumped.
Explosive 






ERW Unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive 
weapons that have been primed, fused, 
armed, or otherwise prepared for use or 
used. It may have been fired, dropped, 
launched, or projected yet remained 
unexploded.
Abandoned ordnance (AXO): Explosive 
weapons that have not been used during 






Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items 
causing casualties that were detonated 
by the presence, proximity, or contact 
of a person or a vehicle that were not 
attributed to a specific mines/ERW type 
either because it was not known what 
type of mine or ERW caused the casualty 
when information was recorded, or due to 
a lack of disaggregation between mines, 
explosives, and ERW causing casualties 
within a dataset, including when mines/
ERW casualties are differentiated from 
other weapon victims.
*The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the Mine Ban 
Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the ground or 
other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty 
unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.
**In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised 
mines that caused casualties because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the 












































































This overview concerns the status of victim assistance, with a focus on 2018 and 2019 as 
relevant. It encompasses a summary of achievements attained as well as the challenges faced, 
by and in, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) victims in need of assistance.1 In particular, it is an opportunity to 
weigh up the state of victim assistance in the context of the completion of the treaty’s 
Maputo Action Plan (2014–2019), with a view to the implementation of the next five-year 
Oslo Action Plan, to be adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference in 2019.
The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which 
States Parties committed to provide assistance for those people harmed by a specific type 
of weapon.2 The ICBL pushed vigorously to have language related to assistance to mine 
victims included in the treaty’s text. The preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties 
“to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the 
social and economic reintegration of mine victims…” Article 6 of the treaty requires that 
each State Party “in a position to do so” to provide such assistance. Article 6 also affirms the 
right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance to the extent possible for victims. 
Since the treaty’s entry into force, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of 
the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with 
limited resources.
1 The Monitor reports on the following Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which there are significant numbers 
of victims: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This list includes 30 States 
Parties that have indicated that they have significant numbers of victims for which they must provide 
care as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of victims in their 
official landmine clearance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. It also 
includes Palestine and Ukraine, as both are indicated to have significant numbers of victims and needs, 
but have not yet comprehensively reported them. See, Algeria, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 
5 Extension Request, 31 March 2011, http://bit.ly/2fzL7V7; and Turkey, Mine Ban Mine Ban Treaty Article 
5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, http://bit.ly/2fzQCmu.
2 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-
convention-text/.
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While the term “landmine survivor” was widely used—including in Landmine Monitor 
reporting—at the time of the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004, 
the treaty text used the legal term “victim.” A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by 
States Parties in the Final Report formally adopted in Nairobi as “those who either individually 
or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.”3 
This widely accepted understanding of who is the focus of assistance also includes family 
members of casualties, both killed and injured, as well as affected communities.
Self-identification as a “victim” or as a “survivor” is an important element of the choice 
of use. “Whether someone sees themselves or someone else as a victim or as a survivor can 
greatly impact their overall sense of self, their quality of life and their reintegration into 
their community as a productive member of society.”4 There is also a concern in the disability 
rights community that use of the word “victim” can reopen the door to discriminatory and 
belittling approaches to persons with disabilities.
The Monitor has tracked progress in the services, programs, and activities that benefit 
victims under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans since 1999. Victim 
assistance aims to reduce the mortality rate of and improve the opportunities for recovery 
and rehabilitation of people injured by mines/ERW, achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of 
victims and the full inclusion of victims in wider society, as well as ensuring that the same 
assistance is available to affected communities.
That assistance includes, but is not limited to, the following components and practices 
(also referred to as pillars): data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency 
and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive 
devices; psychological and psychosocial support; social and economic inclusion; and the 
adoption or adjustment of relevant laws and public policies. Preferably, such assistance is to 
be provided through a holistic and comprehensive approach comprised of all of the above 
elements. In addition, though less information is available, some victim assistance efforts 
are reported that reach family members and other people who have suffered trauma, loss, or 
other harm due to mines/ERW.
It is evident that tens of thousands of mine/ERW victims, persons with disabilities, and 
other people with similar needs have benefited from the increased attention given to the 
issue of victim assistance by States Parties and the international community since the Mine 
Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. Numerous programs and projects to enhance the 
availability, accessibility, and adequacy of healthcare, physical rehabilitation, and social and 
economic inclusion have been implemented.
Despite ongoing financial shortages that evidently reduced the availability of some 
services in recent years, victim assistance efforts have remained, to a large degree, robust, 
and donors and providers have maintained their determination to increase achievements 
and improve the survival rate of people injured and the quality of life of survivor and 
indirect victims. For over two decades, the many improved methods and successful activities 
undertaken, as recorded by the Monitor, have shown that delivering victim assistance is not 
inherently complicated. 
Although many challenges remain in creating access to suitable and enduring services and 
in covering all pillars of holistic and integrated assistance, Monitor research demonstrates 
that there is a much better understanding of the needs in affected countries.
Yet, it is also well recognized that many victims have not had access to emergency medical 
services, comprehensive rehabilitation, or the opportunity to participate in society on an 
equal basis with others. Some have never had access to facilities and services. Many local 
3 See, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,” APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, para. 64; and 
“Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.icbl.org/media/933290/Nairobi-Action-Plan-2005.pdf.
4 Melanie Reimer and Teresa Broers, “Landmine Victim or Landmine Survivor: What Is in a Name?” The 












and international NGOs have reported decreased funding and resources for most countries 
and programs in recent years, especially those not in emergency settings. The decline in 
finances and supplies is limiting existing operations and threatening the sustainability of 
essential programs. It also reveals that existing services are far from meeting the needs of 
victims and the disparities are yet to be covered by other frameworks.
The Mine Ban Treaty’s action plans support victim assistance by building on States Parties’ 
commitments to: save lives; enhance health services; increase physical rehabilitation; 
develop psychosocial support capacities; actively support socio-economic inclusion; develop 
and implement relevant policy frameworks; give consideration to cross-cutting factors, 
including gender, age, and disability; enhance data collection; involve mine victims in the 
work of the treaty; and ensure the meaningful participation of victims and other relevant 
experts at international meetings. 
In June 2004 at the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi, an initial group of 
24 States Parties5 “themselves have indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-
of-thousands of landmine survivors” and that they had the greatest responsibility to act, but 
also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance. All States Parties committed to the 
Maputo Action Plan, which included a set of actions that would advance victim assistance 
through 2019.6
Progress during the Nairobi Action Plan (2004–2009) period was most evident in 
the improved process and planning of assistance, well above that made in the increased 
availability and implementation of health, rehabilitation, economic, or psychological services. 
Those States Parties that had made significant advances on their self-defined objectives realized 
achievements related to data collection, coordination, strategies, and awareness-raising. 
At the beginning of the Cartagena Action Plan period (2009–2014), service provision 
remained inadequate and had not increased significantly nor had life conditions of most 
survivors, though data indicates that the survival rate of people injured improved in that 
time. Thus, many victims received some form of assistance through the years, while facing too 
many gaps in services and implementation of assistance that was largely unsystematic and 
unsustainable. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, 
often supported by international organizations and funding. Furthermore, the steps actually 
made in increasing programs and activities that directly benefited victims, while beneficial, 
were often unrelated to the specific objectives of the strategies that those countries had 
developed for themselves in order to fulfill the commitments of the Nairobi Action Plan.
THE ROADMAP FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE 2014–2019: 
THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN
At the start of the Maputo Action Plan period, approximately two-thirds of States Parties had 
active coordination mechanisms and relevant national plans in place. 
In most of these countries, victim assistance efforts have collaborative coordination, 
combined planning, and/or victim participation. Victims participated in decisions that affect 
their lives and in the implementation of services in nearly all the relevant States Parties. Yet, 
in many countries, victim participation required additional support, especially for victims to 
be effectively included in coordination roles.
The Maputo Action Plan highlights the continued relevance of the actions of the Cartagena 
Action Plan, issues a strong call for effective victim participation, and underscores the 
importance of integrating victim assistance into other frameworks. The plan’s seven victim 
5 UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, PLC/CONF/2004/5, 
9 February 2005, p. 33. Of these countries, 23 reported responsibility at the First Review Conference in 
Nairobi from 29 November to 3 December 2004, and with Ethiopia’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty on 
17 December 2004, the number increased to 24.
6 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, http://bit.ly/2e2R1Ol.
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assistance-related action points set an agreed path for States Parties to continue working 
to address the needs of victims with targeted and mainstream actions across a range of 
ministries and stakeholders and to raise the issue of mine victims in “international, regional 
and national human rights, healthcare, labour and other fora, instruments and domains” 
while continuing to report “measurable achievements” in victim assistance at international 
meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
Relevant action points of the Maputo Action Plan may be summarized as follows:
  Assess the needs of mine victims. Assess the availability and gaps in services. 
Support efforts to refer victims to existing services
  Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives
  Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks
  Strengthen local capacities, enhance coordination, and increase the availability of 
and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures
  Enhance the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of 
mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them
  Raise awareness of the imperative to address the needs and to guarantee the rights 
of mine victims
  Report on measurable improvements
The Maputo Action Plan called on States Parties to undertake actions to address victim 
assistance “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”
The Committee on Victim Assistance replaced the Standing Committee on Victim 
Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration and was given a new mandate, for the first 
time specifically directing the committee to take the discussion of the needs and rights of 
victims to other relevant forums, while continuing to provide advice for States Parties efforts 
to advance in their victim assistance commitments.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE, DISABILITY RIGHTS, AND OTHER 
FRAMEWORKS
Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-
related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance 
into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention 
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW in 2008, and most recently included in 
the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
At the Mine Ban Treaty First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in 1999, the international 
mine action community first articulated the notion that victim assistance was to be a part 
of broader contexts, including human rights approaches.7 Subsequently, in the Mine Ban 
Treaty’s first Action Plan adopted in 2004, States Parties committed to ensuring that they 
effectively address the “fundamental human rights of mine victims” through national legal 
and policy frameworks.8
The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is legally binding, 
providing an overarching mechanism for the amendment of national laws and policies 
related to persons with disabilities. The CRPD does not provide for new rights but it frames 
the existing rights catalog in an accessible way. The CRPD pertains also to victims of 
indiscriminate weapons. Although not all injuries result in long-term physical impairment, 
the impact of indiscriminate weapons frequently results in landmine and ERW survivors 
becoming persons with disabilities and therefore protected by the CRPD.
7 “MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” 27 June 2014, 
http://bit.ly/32RrJbu.












Similarly, over time it has become more widely recognized that, just as efforts to respond 
to the needs of victims should benefit all persons with similar needs, including other persons 
with disabilities, without discrimination, so should the rights of victims be considered by 
disability rights actors. This interconnectivity allows for solution-oriented approaches to 
implementing international legal commitments and legal obligations that arise from the 
CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Mine Ban Treaty.
Global conferences, symposia, and regional 
meetings raised awareness of good practices and 
concrete actions, services, and policies that can, in 
coordination with others, positively alter the lives 
of victims. Chief among those were the “Bridges 
between Worlds” meetings in 2014, which included 
a main global conference held in Colombia that 
discussed assistance to victims of mines/ERW in 
broader contexts of disarmament, human rights, and 
development efforts, particularly disability rights.9 
In September 2019, a three-day Global Conference 
on Assistance to Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and Other Explosive Remnants of War and Disability 
Rights, chaired by Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein 
of Jordan took place in Amman.10
In 2009, national survivor networks previously 
existing as country programs of the United States-
based NGO Survivor Corps (or Landmine Survivors 
Network, LSN) transitioned to become nationally 
registered organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, among 
others. Subsequently, from 2012–2015, the ICBL-CMC’s Survivor Networks Project, supported 
by Norway, provided resources to campaign member networks (including former LSN 
country branches) and trained representatives of survivor networks and disabled person’s 
organizations (DPOs) on monitoring the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, and the CRPD as a means to promote the rights of victims and persons with 
disabilities. Victim assistance NGOs, survivor networks, and DPOs in many countries made 
efforts to collaborate with each other and with development and rights actors to promote 
the inclusion of mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities in mainstream programs 
and in policy-making bodies at national and local levels. 
Since the adoption of the Maputo Action Plan, substantial progress was also made by 
civil society organizations forging links across sectors and regions to advance the rights 
of mine/ERW victims and other persons with similar needs. In 2014, for example, Humanity 
& Inclusion (then-Handicap International), in collaboration with the ICBL-CMC, convened a 
Latin American seminar in Colombia on psychosocial assistance for victims of armed conflict, 
including mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities. This became an annual event, 
bringing together representatives of networks of mine/ERW victims, networks of armed 
conflict survivors, DPOs, and service providers. The fifth Latin American Regional Seminar for 
Strengthening the Network of Landmine and ERW Survivors and Persons with Disabilities, 
hosted by Humanity & Inclusion with ICBL-CMC participation, was held in Bogota in August 
2019, in the lead up to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference. Topics included 
strengthening assistance networks, accessing rights, and monitoring human rights. 
In September 2015, UN Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are designed to address 
9 “Bridges” meetings were also held in Geneva and forged additional relationships among individuals 
working primarily on disability, development, or assistance to victims from a humanitarian perspective.
10 Also sponsored by a Decision adopted by the European Union Council to support implementation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty.
Dr. Tom Shakespeare of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) meets ICBL Ambassador Song Kosal who is quoted 
in the World Report on Disability.
©MBT ISU, 2011
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the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an 
emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. Therefore, the SDGs are 
generally complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the CRPD, and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and offer exceptional opportunities for bridging the relevant frameworks.
More specifically, persons with disabilities are referred to directly in several of the 
SDGs that are highly relevant to the implementation of the CRPD and the humanitarian 
disarmament conventions’ action plans: education (SDG 4), employment (SDG 8), reducing 
inequality (SDG 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including 
persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (SDG 17).
Mine Ban Treaty victim assistance continues to be an essential commitment for victims 
especially in conflict-affected, post-conflict, and fragile states. These same states have 
limited capacity, as reflected in the lack of regular reporting to the Mine Ban Treaty, that 
would help the international community determine how best to earmark assistance. In many 
of these states, the provision of victim assistance can both benefit from, and contribute to, 
the implementation of the SDGs. Victim assistance supports the needs of many other people 
affected by conflict, particularly those impacted by other types of explosive weapons. It is 
clear that a significant commitment to sustained international cooperation is needed to 
assist states in meeting their victim assistance obligations.
Those states with existing capacity and services tend to get the most attention and 
are also most often used as examples of good practices. Yet, many of these states face 
circumstances that limit their opportunities to report on the progress that they have made, 
hindering their ability to identify needs and to request appropriate assistance. With support, 
states facing such challenges can make greater progress, but not if they are overlooked and 
their challenges remain unheard.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION 
PLAN11
The draft Oslo Action Plan confirms the States Parties’ continuing commitment to “ensuring 
the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for 
human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.” It also reaffirms States Parties 
understanding that “victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, 
plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, and to health, 
education, employment, development and poverty reduction in support of the realisation of 
the Sustainable Development Goals.”12
Proposed victim assistance-relevant actions include activities to implement the following:
  Ensure the meaningful participation of mine victims in all related matters and 
meetings13
  A government entity for coordination14
  Inter-governmental planning, national policies, and legal frameworks15
  A centralized database on victims’ needs and challenges16
11 For more information on implementing victim assistance pillars through an action plan see, “Assisting 
the Victims: Recommendations on Implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014,” presented to 
the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by Co-
Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration Belgium and 
Thailand, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 30 November 2009.
12 Norway, “Draft Oslo Action Plan: Submitted by the President of the Fourth Review Conference,” 27 
September 2019, http://bit.ly/344oc9P.
13 See, Draft Oslo Action Plan, Action #4.
14 Ibid., Action #32.
15 Ibid., Action #33.












  Timely first aid response and pre-hospital care17
  A national referral mechanism and directory of services18
  Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services, and psychological and 
psychosocial support services19
  Social and economic inclusion20
  Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian 
emergencies, and natural disasters21
PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE 
ORGANIZATIONS22
Victims were reported to be included through representation in coordination in Afghanistan, 
Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. As yet, States Parties have 
rarely reported on the outcomes of victim participation and how their input is considered or 
acted upon. In some states, victims’ representative organizations and other service providers 
involved in coordination and planning reported that the concerns and contributions of 
victims were not genuinely taken into account, despite their attendance at relevant meetings.
RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO COORDINATE 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE23
Of the 33 States Parties, 21 had active victim assistance coordination linked with disability 
coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs of mine/ERW 
victims. The states with coordination mechanisms in 2018–2019 were: Afghanistan, Angola 
Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, and Turkey. Angola’s coordination mechanism is not interconnected with disability 
rights coordination.
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING, NATIONAL POLICIES, 
AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS24
Adopting and implementing a comprehensive inter-ministerial plan of action that identifies 
gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims and, or among, other persons with 
disabilities is a key step to ensuring a coordinated response to the needs.
Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand have a current plan that addresses national victim assistance 
activities and Zimbabwe has a set of measurable objectives.
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, and 
Yemen need to revise, finalize, or adopt a draft and implement their national disability 
plan, policy, or strategy that includes objectives that respond to the needs of victims and 
recognizes its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring 
structure. Mozambique still has to implement the Action Plan for Assistance to Victims 
through relevant government departments and ministries. 
17 Ibid., Action #35.
18 Ibid., Action #36.
19 Ibid., Action #39.
20 Ibid., Action #40.
21 Ibid., Action #41.
22 Ibid., Action #42; CRPD Article 1 – Purpose – Article 29 – Participation in political and public life.
23 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #32; CRPD Article 33 – National implementation and monitoring.
24 Draft Oslo Action Plan, Action #33; CRPD Article 33 – National implementation and monitoring.
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States Parties that need to develop a plan or strategy include DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey. In the meantime, DRC requires 
a sustainable planning and coordination mechanism working at national and local levels to 
increase efforts to implement the victim assistance objectives of its national mine action 
strategy. Turkey, which now has coordination, must develop a plan for implementation of 
victim assistance. Newer States Parties, Palestine, and Sri Lanka are yet to create a strategic 
framework for victim assistance.
CENTRALIZED DATABASE WITH NEEDS AND 
CHALLENGES25
States Parties commit to assess the needs of victims. This commitment includes assessing 
the availability and gaps in services and support, as well as existing or new requirement 
activities needed to meet the needs of victims in the frameworks of disability, health, 
education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. Assessment also provides an 
initial opportunity to refer victims to existing services. 
Few structured national needs assessment surveys were conducted since 2015. Mine 
Action Centers and service providers often collected information on victims in an ongoing 
manner in conjunction with other victim assistance and program activities. 
Some notable survey activities and assessments of needs of survivors since 2015 included 
the following:
Afghanistan’s National Disability Database, initiated in 2017, was under development and 
planned to be installed by the end of 2019. Statistics on persons with disabilities and the 
families of those killed could be used to coordinate with the ministry of finance, pension 
department, and population registration department to provide the necessary services. 
In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and medical needs of marginalized ERW 
victims carried out during 2013–2016 was completed. In Cambodia, village-level quality 
of life assessments for victims and other persons with disabilities continued into 2019. 
Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing in Colombia and new data 
management systems were used during the period. 
Croatia made early progress in the development of a unified database on the needs of 
mine/ERW victims, specifically including families, which stalled from 2017 onward. In Serbia, 
the ministry responsible for victim assistance worked with other government institutions 
to improve coordination on data and needs assessment. In Tajikistan, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) carried out needs assessment from which 
information was entered into the national database to be shared with relevant stakeholders. 
Thailand reported that data collection on mine/ERW victims was relatively advanced and 
that survivors are included in disability assessments. In Yemen, more mine/ERW victims were 
registered with the mine action center through ongoing survey conducted jointly with the 
national survivor association until increased conflict disrupted regular assessment and data 
collection.
Algeria needed to ensure that all victims are registered and therefore able to receive 
pensions and other benefits and to develop a central data collection mechanism on victims 
needs to improve planning of victim assistance. BiH needed to review its existing data and 
speed up the establishment of a mine/ERW victims database in Republika Srpska. Burundi 
needed to develop a national database on victims and needs. Chad has yet to improve and 
systematize casualty data collection. Croatia needed to complete the national victim survey 
and unified victim database in process since 2015. Eritrea needed to develop a mechanism 
to document, record, and share information on mine/ERW accidents. Iraq needed to establish 
a unified and coordinated system of data collection and analysis for survivors and other 
persons with disabilities. Mine action actors in Somalia were alerted to the need for 












collecting appropriate data from a situation assessment of the victim assistance sector. And 
Yemen needed to improve the collection of data and create a usable database of victims’ 
needs.
Disability survey, including through national census questions, was proposed in many 
national and international contexts. CRPD Article 31 calls on States Parties to collect 
information, including statistical and research data, and to disaggregate this information to 
identify barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising their rights. Action #35 of 
the draft Oslo Action Plan includes each relevant state having a centralized database that 
includes information on mine victims and needs and challenges, disaggregated by gender, 
age, and disability.
TIMELY FIRST AID RESPONSE FOR CASUALTIES AND 
ADEQUATE PRE-HOSPITAL TRAUMA CARE26
Time-sensitive emergency care includes interventions such as first aid and field trauma 
response, emergency evacuation, availability of transport, and immediate medical care that 
involves assessment and prehospital communication of critical information for patient 
handover. The provision of appropriate emergency medical services can considerably affect 
the chance of the survival and the speed of recovery of mine victims, as well as outcomes of 
injuries and the severity of impairments. 
Improvements in medical care services to strengthen emergency response capacities 
for people injured by mines/ERW and others in affected communities were reported in 
Afghanistan and Croatia. 
In Guinea-Bissau, only the hospital in the capital city can treat serious injuries. There is 
a drastic problem of accessibility of immediate healthcare across the DRC where, in most 
cases, people injured cannot receive appropriate assistance, resulting in death. In South 
Sudan, incidents often occurred in remote areas far from access to health services. 
International organizations continued to provide much needed assistance in conflict-
affected areas. Healthcare services for all persons with disabilities in Iraq decreased over 
time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, healthcare deteriorated, many 
medical facilities were damaged, and ongoing conflict further undermined the struggling 
health system. In Ukraine, along the line of contact, primary-healthcare centers and satellite 
services received required equipment and medicines.
NATIONAL REFERRAL MECHANISMS27
States Parties can improve accessibility of services by ensuring that existing data collection, 
needs assessment, and service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate 
health and rehabilitation facilities. Similarly, taking a holistic approach to assistance, health, 
and rehabilitation service providers can provide referrals to others who can support the 
inclusion of victims. Referral mechanisms can involve at the national level mechanisms as 
well as local community referrals network, including through community-based rehabilitation 
systems. 
Since 2015, national governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both 
mine action centers and government ministries, such as: Algeria’s Ministry of National 
Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola’s Ministry of Assistance and Social 
Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority’s data department 
CMVIS; the Colombian Department for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines 
(DAICMA) and the broader government run reparations program at the Victim’s Unit; the 
26 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #35; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal mobility; CRPD 
Article 26 – Habilitation and rehabilitation.
27 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #36; Article 4 – General obligations.
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Rehabilitation and Integration Division within Eritrea’s Ministry of Labour and Human 
Welfare; Iraq’s Directorate for Mine Action; the Tajikistan Mine Action Center; and the Yemen 
Mine Action Center.
However, many more non-governmental groups and organizations provided referrals at 
a national or local level in the States Parties with victims, including a range of survivor 
networks, national NGOs and DPOs, and international NGOs, notably Humanity & Inclusion, 
as well as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.
REHABILITATION, HEALTHCARE, PSYCHOSOCIAL 
SUPPORT28
In many countries, including Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, 
and Somalia, a lack of available and accessible medical care may have a significant impact on 
the quality of life of victims. Many affected countries continue to report inadequate numbers 
of trained staff, health services, and other treatments such as pain management in remote, 
rural, and other mine-affected areas. 
Several countries saw improved healthcare infrastructure in affected areas ensuring 
that facilities have adequate equipment, supplies, and medicines necessary to meet basic 
standards.
Rehabilitation including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as 
prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs help the person regain or improve 
mobility and to engage in everyday activities. Psychosocial support is often an integral 
aspect of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation services with a comprehensive or multidisciplinary 
approach involve a team that includes a medical doctor, physiotherapist, prosthetist, and 
social worker as well as other specialists as needed. The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights Article 12.1. recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Article 15.1.(b) of that 
convention recognizes the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications. This can also apply to prosthetic and assistive devices.
States can increase the sustainability of rehabilitation by allocating a specific budget line 
for physical and functional rehabilitation needs of all persons with disabilities including 
victims. In Algeria, victims and persons with disabilities continued to have access to most 
prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. Additional rehabilitation facilities were 
built in Iraq in 2018–2019, including a much-needed new center in Mosul, but the entire 
rehabilitation system lacked capacity to deliver enough services and devices to meet the 
increased needs. 
In Afghanistan, authorities have acknowledged that it would be unrealistic to consider 
the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical 
rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces of Afghanistan, however at least 
seven more centers were still needed. A record number of Afghan citizens with disabilities 
sought rehabilitation services in 2018. Afghanistan reported that 90% of the population 
lives more than 100km away from a rehabilitation center and 20 of the 34 provinces do 
not have a prosthetics center. Access to rehabilitation centers is also extremely limited in 
Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda.
In Cambodia, slow progress was made in the handover of rehabilitation centers to 
government management while securing resources for their sustainability. In BiH and Serbia, 
where orthopedics are state regulated, excessive and unnecessary bureaucratic procedures 
limited access to devices. Iraq developed a multi-sector rehabilitation strategy and Palestine 
adopted an emergency rehabilitation plan. 
28 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #39; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal mobility; CRPD 













States/areas Examples of survivor networks
Afghanistan Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO)
Albania Albanian Assistance for Integration and Development (ALB-AID) 
Survivor Network
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzBL) Survivor Network
BiH Organization of Amputees Republika Srpska (UDAS)
Cambodia Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions (CamC-
BLCM) Survivor Network; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Cambodia
Colombia District Association of Landmine Survivors (ADISMAM); the Colombi-
an Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM)
DRC National Association of Mine Survivors and Victims Advocacy (ANAS-
DIV)
El Salvador Foundation Network of Survivors and Person with Disabilities
Ethiopia Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO)
Mozambique Network for Mine Victims (RAVIM)
Nepal Nepalese Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) Survivor Network
Senegal Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (ISAD)
Serbia Assistance, Advocacy, Access Serbia (AAAS)
Tajikistan Tajikistan Survivor Network
Vietnam Association for Empowerment of Person of Persons with Disabilities 
(AEPD)
Uganda Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA)
Western Sahara Sahrawi Association of Mine Victims (ASAVIM) 
Yemen Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS)
Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated in italics.
A much-needed new rehabilitation center was launched in Mosul, Iraq in 2018, however 
the entire rehabilitation sector required increased resources and capacity. In Palestine, 
the main prosthetic center in Gaza faced significant strain on its limited resources while 
addressing an increase in patients with amputations among protesters who had been shot in 
the legs. In part to meet this demand, a new prosthetic hospital and disability rehabilitation 
center was opened in 2019. Accessing materials and financial resources were an obstacle 
to rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, where most prostheses were available through charities. In 
Yemen, increased support to the physical rehabilitation sector was reported in response to 
the needs caused by ongoing conflict, but availability of assistance overall remained far from 
adequate for meeting those needs.
Outreach programs including mobile clinics improved access to physical rehabilitation 
services in affected communities, often offering both repair and replacement of devices. 
Access to physiotherapy care was extended through home visits in El Salvador. In Nicaragua, 
the health ministry hired additional technicians for satellite centers and the national 
rehabilitation center. Since 2015, mine/ERW victims from Senegal have been receiving 
prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an agreement between the ICRC, the Senegalese 
Survivor Network, and the mine action center. 
Despite this being the pillar of victim assistance that has seen the greatest focus, many 
outstanding essential activities remained to be fulfilled for States Parties in the field of 
rehabilitation, for example: in Afghanistan there was a need to expand access to physical 
rehabilitation needs, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to 
78 
receive rehabilitation is difficult for victims; in Albania to develop existing capacities and 
management of the prosthetic center in Tirana and increase financial resources; in Angola to 
adequately support the prosthetic and orthopedic centers, including provision of materials; in 
BiH to improve the quality and sustainability of services, including by upgrading community-
based rehabilitation centers; and in Burundi to improve access to physical rehabilitation for 
victims by eliminating fees for services.
It remained necessary for Cambodia to improve sustainability of the entire physical 
rehabilitation sector; for Chad to increase investment in physical rehabilitation services; 
for DRC to improve the availability of physical rehabilitation and psychosocial services 
significantly throughout the country; for Eritrea to mobilize resources to expand the 
community-based rehabilitation program; for Ethiopia to establish a national supply chain of 
rehabilitation materials; for Turkey to make adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities 
a priority in the mine-affected regions; for Sri Lanka to coordinate rehabilitation and insure 
adequate supplies; and for Uganda to improve the sustainability, quality, and availability of 
prosthesis and rehabilitation services, including by enhancing coordination and dedicating 
the necessary national resources to what is currently considered a non-funded priority.
Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, 
individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based peer-support groups, networks of 
survivors and associations of persons with disabilities, as well as some types of sports and 
recreation activities.
In BiH, there was a program to develop structured peer-to-peer psychological support, 
by victims for victims, in healthcare and rehabilitation facilities, however such initiatives 
remained rare. In Senegal, victims supported other victims who received assistance in Guinea-
Bissau. Survivor networks, which often provide peer-to-peer and collective psychosocial 
support, struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available. Mine/
ERW victims in Kinshasa hold monthly peer-support meetings.
Many countries had improved sport and recreational activities for persons with disabilities, 
including families, such as wheelchair sports. However, access to cultural activities for victims 
and persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others was often lacking.
The following are some of the needs for psychological and psychosocial support 
identified: in Afghanistan, to provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer 
support, in particular to new victims as well as those who have been traumatized and live in 
isolation; in Cambodia to improve the quality and availability psychological support services; 
in Colombia to include peer support services under the health insurance system; in DRC to 
improve the availability of psychosocial services significantly, especially outside the capital; 
in Mozambique to prioritize assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs; in 
Nicaragua to dedicate resources to implementation of psychosocial support programs; and 
in Senegal to ensure the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION29
Most frequently NGOs or charity institutions implemented socio-economic inclusion projects 
for victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, 
micro-credit, income generation, and employment. However, there are exceptions, in Serbia, 
for example, the priority of the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs 
was the social inclusion of veterans, veterans with disabilities, civilian invalids of war, and 
families of military war casualties. Thus, the state supported the development of veteran 
and disability protection services, social protection services, and employment in remote and 
rural areas.
Action #39 of the draft Oslo Action Plan includes “efforts to ensure the social and 
economic inclusion of mine victims” through access to education and capacity-building.
29 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #40; CRPD Article 27 – Work and employment; CRPD Article 28 – Adequate 












Economic inclusion was a reported priority need in all states, and particularly in Cambodia, 
Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda where employment, work 
training, livelihood incentives, and other economic opportunities continued to be areas with 
the greatest need for improvement for victims. There was a recognized need to increase 
economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities and develop 
education and training that are appropriate for victims and persons with disabilities who 
lack education and literacy and have no work or land from which to make a living.
A lack of awareness of disability rights and inclusion principles among teachers and fellow 
pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and prevent child victims from participating 
fully in educational activities. For example, it was reported that in Somalia the majority of 
children with disabilities were not accepted as pupils at school. 
National programs to promote inclusive education at all levels, as part of the national 
education plans, policies and programs can contribute to the inclusion of child survivors and 
indirect child victims. In Afghanistan, an inclusive education policy was drafted, translated 
into national languages, and shared with the Ministry of Education for review and approval 
by its scientific and academic council. However, government-run national inclusive education 
program that increased the enrollment of children with disabilities in the country since 
2008 lost core international funding from victim assistance sources in 2016, but through 
2018 was implemented in part by NGO stakeholders. In DRC, one NGO conducted local 
inclusive education awareness-raising activities. But for another that also has remedial 
teaching schools in the east of the country for children of mine casualties, funding was 
insufficient for the school year in 2018–2019.
Gender-sensitive, age-appropriate, and disability-inclusive victim assistance
Action #39 of the Draft Oslo Action Plan calls for the “removal of physical, social, cultural, 
political, attitudinal and communication barriers in a gender-sensitive, age-appropriate and 
disability inclusive manner.”
Children, especially boys, are one of the largest groups of survivors. Since child survivors 
have specific and additional needs in all aspects of support, age- and disability-appropriate 
assistance is required.30
Following are some examples of related activities and challenges.
In Yemen, where the UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported that women, children, 
the elderly, and persons with disabilities are at greater risk of losing access to health services. 
UNICEF expanded its victim assistance services to children amputees in 2018 through 
support to two prosthesis and rehabilitation centers in Aden and Taizz governorates that 
provided the children with prosthesis and artificial limbs. Most of the children were mines/
ERW survivors.
In BiH, survivors received support in setting up income-generating activities, including 
children and widows of people killed by mines/ERW. 
In Afghanistan, the inclusive and child-friendly education coordination meetings focused 
on inclusion of the children who do not have access to education, in particular, children 
with disabilities. The action plan of the Technical Subcommittee of Assistance to Victims 
in Colombia included identification of child and adolescent survivors in order to provide 
opportunities for inclusive education within the framework of a 2017 decree, which regulates 
inclusive education for all persons with disabilities.
30 For more information about the impact of mines/ERW on children and the wider impact of armed conflict 
on children, see Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict, “Landmines, Cluster Munitions and Unexploded Ordnances,” undated, childrenandarmedconflict.
un.org/effects-of-conflict/landmines-cluster-munitions-and-unexploded-ordonances/; “Focus: Explosive 
remnants of war,” Victim Assistance Editorial Team at the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, quoted 
in in UNICEF, “The State of the World’s Children 2013: Children with disabilities,” 30 May 2013, www.unicef.
org/sowc2013/focus_war_remnants.html; and “Strengthening the Assistance to Child Victims,” submitted 
by Austria and Colombia, Maputo Review Conference Documents, undated, www.maputoreviewconference.
org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Austria-Colombia-Paper.pdf.
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In Guinea-Bissau, the ICRC funded education for children with disabilities and installed 
ramps in front of school. In Turkey, it was reported that a large number of school-age children 
with disabilities did not receive adequate access to education. In Iraq, many children with 
disabilities dropped out of public school due to insufficient physical access to school 
buildings. Issues preventing children with disabilities attending school include a lack of 
transport, a lack of assistive devices, physical barriers, teachers without appropriate training, 
and the need for children to help with housework.
In Mozambique, UNICEF and Humanity & Inclusion together reach children with 
disabilities with Information, Orientation, and Social Support Service mobile teams, which 
identify children with disabilities and provide services, including assistive devices and 
physical modifications to enable school attendance. In Zimbabwe, men, women, and children 
have received prosthetics from the collaboration between a prosthetics center and mine 
action operators HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid, despite there being no specific 
programs or activities targeting women or children survivors.
While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women, and girls are likely 
to be disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents. They often suffer 
multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. Gender is a key consideration in victim 
assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to statistical disaggregation 
of casualties and service beneficiaries. In 2018, the Gender and Mine Action Programme 
published an Operational Guidance paper on victim assistance responsive to gender and 
other diversity aspects with examples of good practices.31 The ICBL-CMC and Landmine 
Monitor Survivor Assistance Gender Focal Point participated in the launch.
PROTECTION OF MINE VICTIMS AND PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES IN SITUATIONS OF RISK, INCLUDING 
SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT, HUMANITARIAN 
EMERGENCIES, AND NATURAL DISASTERS32
Generally, in conflict situations, civilians remain extremely vulnerable and under-protected. 
The UN Secretary-General found in 2019, “It is the cause of considerable concern, then, that 
the state of the protection of civilians today is tragically similar to that of 20 years ago.”33 
Moreover, during times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and 
natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme 
challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing 
adequate and appropriate services. This five-year period of the Maputo Action Plan was 
marked by increased conflict, state fragility, and growing numbers of refugees and displaced 
persons resulting from conflict, as well as by the impact of conflict and natural disasters 
gravely affecting victim assistance efforts in a number of States Parties. 
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims 
of these weapons, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance 
with relevant human rights law. Those which are States Parties to the CRPD also have an 
obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities 
in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies. 
31 See, GMAP, “Victim assistance responsive to gender and other diversity aspects,” Geneva 2018, 
www.gmap.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/gmap_guidances_EN-web.pdf.
32 Draft Oslo Action Plan Action #41; CRPD Article 11 – Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies.
33 UN Security Council, “Protection of civilians in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2019/373, 












In 2018–2019, several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with mine/ERW victims were in 
situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.
An even greater number of the relevant States Parties—Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Chad, Colombia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe—have a Humanitarian Response Plan 
to address a humanitarian crisis, a protracted or sudden onset emergency that requires the 
support of more than one UN agency for international humanitarian assistance.
During the Maputo Action Plan period it was recognized that much remains to be done to 
link response approaches to disaster and conflict to ensure respect for the rights of persons 
with disabilities, including mine/ERW victims. 
The 15-year Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 adopted in March 
2015 contains several references to persons with disabilities in emergency situations, due to 
active advocacy by disability rights groups. However, the final document omitted references 
to armed conflict due to sensitivities about the use of the term. Yet, armed conflict and 
attacks on healthcare providers were increasingly concerning and impacted the availability 
of services in affected countries.34
The charter on the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian Action was 
adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016. To date, only three of at 
least 12 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that have situations of armed conflict have signed 
the charter. Those three countries are Afghanistan, Colombia, and Thailand.
An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Inclusion of Persons 
with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt 
implementation guidelines by the end of 2018, that was later extended to the end of 2019. 
In June 2019, the Security Council adopted its first text on the protection of persons with 
disabilities in conflict, Resolution 2475.35
Armed violence and conflict also directly impact victim assistance efforts. For example, 
in Afghanistan on 25 December 2018, militants from an unidentified non-state armed group 
attacked and entered the building of the newly established State Ministry for Martyrs and 
Disabled Affairs, resulting in more than 40 people killed and others taken hostage. The CRPD 
Committee Experts reviewing Iraq’s reporting in September 2019 found that the challenges 
and consequences of “18 years of war, armed conflict and terrorism…had ravaged Iraq and…
had had a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.”36 The conflict in Syria 
caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty 
States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons who have fled Syria.
Natural disasters during the period were also devastating. In 2019, floods in Mozambique 
severely affected persons with disabilities in remote and rural areas. In 2015, flash rains 
and massive floods destroyed houses and infrastructure in the Sahrawi refugee camps 
situated near Tindouf in Algeria, near Western Sahara where hundreds of victims live with 
little outside support. An earthquake in Nepal saw the national survivor network redirect 
resources to assisting persons with disabilities in recovering from the destruction.
34 See, Health Care in Danger website at healthcareindanger.org. See also, Safeguarding Health in Conflict 
website at www.safeguardinghealth.org/.
35 UN, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2475 (2019), Ground-Breaking Text on Protection of 
Persons with Disabilities in Conflict,” 20 June 2019, www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13851.doc.htm.
36 OHCHR, “Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities discusses the impact of the armed 
conflict on persons with disabilities in Iraq,” 11 September 2019, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24976&LangID=E.
Deminer Zeinab Hashem in southern Lebanon.














SUPPORT FOR  
MINE ACTION
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the 
right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order 
to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action 
provided for calendar year 2018 by affected countries and international donors. Cooperation 
and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance 
can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of 
experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing. 
2018 FIGURES AND TRENDS
Total Support to Mine Action—Thirty-three donors and eight affected states reported 
contributing US$699.5 million in international and national support for mine action in 
20181; this is $95.1 million less than the revised 2017 amount (a 12% decrease).
International contributions accounted for 92% of overall support for mine action in 2018, 
while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the 
remaining 8% of global funding.
International Contributions—After two years of sustained growth in 2016 and 2017, the 
level of international support for mine action provided by donors declined from $696.3 
million in 2017 to $642.6 million in 2018 (an 8% decrease). This represents the second-
highest level of international support recorded by the Monitor.2
  The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—
the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, 
1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs 
for calendar year 2018, as of October 2019.  All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed 
in current US dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster 
munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely 
disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a 
fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The total amount of international support in 2017 was updated 
to include revised contributions from France and the United States (US). 
2 The Monitor maintains records of international support to mine action back to 1996, and national support 
back to 2002. 
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and Germany—contributing a total of $458.1 million, or 71% of all international 
funding for 2018.
  The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia and Lao PDR—
received a combined total of $351.2 million, representing 55% of all international 
contributions.
  International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and 
risk education (62% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), capacity-building (2%), 
and advocacy (1%). The remaining 28% was not disaggregated by the donors.
National Contributions—The Monitor identified eight affected states that provided $56.9 
million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, down $41.4 million (a 
42% decrease) from 2017 when 10 affected countries reported contributing $98.3 million.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2018
In 2018, donors contributed more than $642 million in international support for mine 
action—a decrease of $53.7 million (8%) from the $696.3 million reported in 2017. While 
this halts the two-year in a row growth seen in 2016 and 2017, it is the second-highest level 
of funding ever recorded in Monitor data, going back to 1996.3
International support for mine action: 2008–2018*
Note: * Not adjusted for inflation.
DONORS IN 2018
In 2018, 26 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, three states not party, the EU, and three other 
institutions4 contributed a total of $642.6 million to mine action. 
A small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action 
support with the five largest donors (the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany) accounting 
3 Data for 2018 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 
Reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2018, UNMAS Annual 
Report 2018, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Ten of the 26 States Parties documented in this 
chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2018, 
compared to 13 out of 28 States Parties in 2017. 
4 China, South Korea, and the US are the three states not party. The three institutions are the Organization 
for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), the United 
















































for nearly three-quarters (71%) of all international support with a combined total of $458.1 
million. The US remained the largest mine action donor with $201.7 million and it alone 
provided nearly a third (31%) of all international mine action support in 2018. The EU ranked 
second with $108.1 million, or 17% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the UK, 
Norway, and Germany—provided more than $40 million each.
Contributions by donors: 2014–20185
Donor
Contribution (US$ million)
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Total
US 201.7 320.6 152.4 159.3 113.1 947.1
EU 108.1 67.6 76.9 23.5 85.7 361.8
UK 58.1 26.7 24.9 15.4 13.1 138.2
Norway 47.7 39.2 31.7 22.3 41.8 182.7
Germany 42.5 84.4 37.3 15.2 17.5 196.9
Japan 37.2 32.5 40.7 49.3 49.1 208.8
Denmark 23.4 15.5 10.2 9.2 12.1 70.4
Netherlands 19.4 19.2 25.2 22.1 25.9 111.8
Sweden 18.6 5.2 6.5 6.1 7.8 44.2
Switzerland 15.0 19.5 16.6 17.4 18.1 86.6
France 12.7 11.9 3.2 1.1 1.3 30.2
Canada 11.3 10.9 13.3 10.8 7.7 54.0
New Zealand 9.2 5.4 12.5 3.2 7.5 37.8
Australia 7.8 4.0 11.1 4.1 6.6 33.6
OCHA 6.1 1.6 4.1 0.4 0 12.2
Italy 4.3 3.9 2.8 3.0 2.2 16.2
Ireland 3.9 1.8 3.3 3.6 4.5 17.1
Belgium 3.3 0.9 2.9 0.3 3.2 10.6
Finland 3.2 3.3 0 5.5 8.0 20.0
China 2.5 0 0 0 0 2.5
South Korea 2.0 0.3 2.5 0.3 0.2 5.3
Austria 1.8 1.2 1.1 0.02 0.02 4.1
Luxembourg 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 7.2
Other donors* 1.4 19.3 2.4 2.8 3.8 29.7
Total 642.6 696.3 482.9 376.5 430.7 2,629.0
* Other donors in 2018 included: Andorra, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, 
Slovenia, Spain, the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International 
Development (OFID), and the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden. 
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. OCHA = UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs.
Another 10 donors contributed less than $1 million each, six fewer compared to the 16 
contributing donors in that range in 2017.
5 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of 
international support for 2017 was updated as a result of revised France and US funding totals. 
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Support from States Parties in 2018 accounted for more than half of all donor funding, 
with 26 countries providing $322 million. This represents an 11% increase from the $288.9 
million recorded in 2017.
In 2018, the EU and its Member States6 contributed a total of $301.5 million and accounted 
for 47% of the total international support, up from the $244.5 million provided in 2017 (35% 
of the total international funding for that year).
Twenty donors contributed more in 2018 than they did in 2017, including a $40.5 million 
increase from the EU (60%), and a $31.4 million increase from the UK (117%). Additionally, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden increased their assistance by more than $7 million each. Two 
new donors were also identified in 2018: China and Cyprus.
In contrast, 11 donors decreased their funding, led by the US (down $118.9 million, a 37% 
decrease) and Germany (down $41.9 million, a 50% decrease).7 Additionally, six donors from 
2017 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2018.
Summary of changes in 2018
Change Donors Combined total
Increase of more than 
$10 million
EU, UK, and Sweden $85.3 million 
increase
Increase of less than 
$10 million
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New 




Decrease of more than 
$10 million
Germany and the US $160.8 million 
decrease
Decrease of less than 
$10 million
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 




New donors in 2018 China and Cyprus $2.5 million 
provided in 2018
Donors from 2017 that 
did not report new 
funding in 2018
Monaco, Portugal, Turkey, the Howard 
Buffett Foundation, the Sudan 
Humanitarian Fund, and the UN
$17.3 million 
provided in 2017
The table opposite summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 
donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and US dollar terms, and shows the 
impact of the exchange rates on the US dollar value of international contributions: 
  In US dollar terms, mine action international support rose in 11 countries and the EU, 
with the biggest percentage increases recorded in Sweden (+258%), the UK (+117%), 
and Australia (98%). In national currency terms, increases were recorded in nine 
countries and the EU and in most instances, they were less pronounced (with the 
exception of Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, where the increases were greater 
when expressed in national currency terms). 
6 Eighteen EU Member States provided funding in 2018: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. 
7 These declines followed unusually large 2017 totals and were thus expected. At the Landmine Monitor 
briefing at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, the US (from the floor) and Germany (from the 
panel) both stated that such exceptionally high funding would not be repeated annually. Nevertheless 
both countries were among the five largest donors in 2018. Landmine Monitor Briefing, Mine Ban Treaty 














  Consequently, whereas five states reported decreases in their mine action 
contributions in 2018, after conversion into US dollars, these reductions were either 
smaller in percentage terms or reversed by a slight increase, as was the case for 
Canada and the Netherlands. 















US –US$118.9 million –37% –118.9 million –37%
EU +€31.6 million +53% +40.5 million +60%
Germany –€38.7 million –52% –41.9 million –50%
Norway +NOK64 million +20% +8.5 million +22%
UK +£22.7 million +109% +31.4 million +117%
Japan +¥467 million +13% +4.7 million +15%
Denmark +DKK45.3 million +44% +7.9 million +51%
Netherlands –€0.6 million –4% +0.2 million +1%
Switzerland –CHF4.5 million –23% –4.5 million –23%
France +€0.2 million +2% +0.8 million +6%
Sweden +SEK117.1 million +265% +13.4 million +258%
Canada –C$0.6 million –4% +0.4 million +4%
New Zealand +NZ$5.6 million +74% +3.8 million +71%
Australia +A$5.3 million +102% +3.9 million +98%
Italy +€0.4 million +9% +0.5 million +12%
FUNDING PATHS
Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known 
as the International Trust Fund).
In 2018, contributions through UNMAS totaled $99.8 million from 23 donors. Several 
small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action.9 At least five donors, as well as the 
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), allocated $2.4 million in 2018 through the 
ITF for mine action programs.
While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often 
carried out by an array of partnering institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies. 
Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2018 included 
Norwegian People’s Aid ($42.1 million), Mines Advisory Group ($37.1 million), HALO Trust ($35.8 
million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($32 million), DanChurchAid 
8 Average exchange rates for 2018: A$1=US$0.7481; C$1.1957=US$1; DKK6.3131=US$1; €1=US$1.1817; 
¥110.4=US$1; NZ$0.6929=US$1; NOK8.1318=US$1; SEK8.6945=US$1; CHF0.9784=US$1; and 
£1=US$1.3363. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2019, www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.
9 The small donors included Andorra, Cyprus, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Spain, as well as UNA-
Sweden.
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($26.6 million), Humanity & Inclusion ($11.9 million), and the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining ($11.4 million).
RECIPIENTS
A total of 43 states and three other areas received $569.7 million from 31 donors in 2018. A 
further $72.9 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, 
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The 
top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Croatia, and Lao PDR—received 55% of all 
international support in 2018.
Iraq received the largest amount of funding (18% of all international support) from the 
largest number of donors (18). Fifteen states and one area, or 35% of all recipients, had only 
one donor.10









Iraq 116.4 Nepal 2.2
Global 72.9 Western Sahara 1.8
Afghanistan 71.8 Philippines 1.8
Syria 66.7 Chad 1.7
Croatia 49.9 Serbia 1.6
Lao PDR 46.4 Palau 1.5
Colombia 33.1 Georgia 1.5
Libya 27.5 Jordan 1.4
Lebanon 16.2 Albania 1.0
Vietnam 15.0 Kosovo 0.8
Cambodia 14.4 Thailand 0.8
Ukraine 11.9 Somaliland 0.8
South Sudan 11.4 Solomon Islands 0.6
Somalia 10.7 Guinea-Bissau 0.5
Yemen 9.3 Montenegro 0.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 8.2 Mali 0.4
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC)
7.8 Benin 0.4
Sri Lanka 7.3 Tunisia 0.1
Angola 7.1 Nigeria 0.1
Zimbabwe 6.1 Central African Republic (CAR) 0.1
Sudan 5.1 Marshall Islands 0.1
Myanmar 2.9 Senegal 0.03
Palestine 2.6 Turkey 0.008
Tajikistan 2.2 Total 642.6
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
More than two-fifths of international support (44%, or $281.5 million) went to 10 countries 
10 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Tunisia, Turkey, 














and one other area with massive contamination.11 Most 
of this funding went to clearance and risk education 
projects.
In 2018, 32 states and areas experienced a change 
of more than 20% in funding compared to 2017, 
including 18 recipients receiving more support, 
and 14 recipients receiving less support, two of 
which received no support. These fluctuations may 
reflect shifts in donor priorities and changes in local 
situations.
Afghanistan and Croatia were the recipients with 
the largest increases, receiving respectively $29.5 
million and $37.1 million more than in 2017. In 
addition, two countries saw a substantial increase in 
support received: Lebanon ($9.4 million more) and 
Lao PDR ($7.2 million more).
  Support to Afghanistan ($71.8 million) increased by 70% in 2018. OCHA provided 
$4.8 million to support mine action activities via UNMAS. Three donors considerably 
increased their contributions compared to 2017: the UK ($16.4 million more), the 
Netherlands ($4.4 million more), and Germany ($2.4 million more). 
  Support to Croatia jumped from $12.9 million in 2017 to $37.5 million in 2018, 
following the awarding of EU funding to support clearance activities. The EU was 
Croatia’s sole international donor in 2018.
  Support to Lebanon ($16.2 million) more than doubled from 2017. This was due to 
the increase in the US contribution ($4 million provided in 2018 compared to $1.5 
million in 2017), the EU ($5.3 million provided in 2018) and the UK ($1.4 million 
provided) in order to support clearance and risk education operations.
  Support to Lao PDR ($46.4 million) increased by nearly one-fifth in 2018, following 
increases in funding from Japan (about $10 million more than in 2017), and the UK 
($1.3 million more than in 2017).
Iraq was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $86.9 million less than in 2017. 
Three additional countries experienced a high-value decline in support received in 2018: 
Colombia ($35.3 million less), Syria ($26.2 million less), and Chad ($24 million less). These 
decreases were the result of changes in donors’ contributions:
  Support to Iraq and Syria respectively dropped by 43% and 28%, as was expected 
after the massive contributions reported by Germany and the US in 2017. Support to 
Iraq in 2018 marked the return to a level of funding closer to that reported in 2016 
($79.7 million).
  Support to Chad in 2018 ($1.7 million) was 93% lower than funding in 2017, primarily 
due to a decline after massive EU contributions to support clearance activities with 
$25.7 million provided in 2017. 
  Support to Colombia ($33.1 million) was reduced by more than half in 2018. The drop 
was mainly due to no new contributions reported by Japan ($9.3 million provided in 
2017) and the Howard Buffett Foundation ($16.1 million provided in 2017). However, 
Colombia was the sixth largest country-recipient of mine action support.
11 Massive contamination is defined by ICBL-CMC as more than 100km². Recipients of international support 
with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, 
Turkey, Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.
Dog handler Ahmad Al Akhdar with his dog Brick in 
southern Lebanon. 
© NPA, January 2019
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Summary of changes in 2018
Change Recipients Combined total
Increase of more than 
$10 million
Afghanistan, Croatia, and 
“Global”
$83.8 million increase
Increase between $10 
and $1 million
Angola, Cambodia, DRC, Lao 
PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, 
and Vietnam
$39 million increase
Increase of less than $1 
million
BiH, Jordan, Nepal, Palau, 
Palestine, Philippines, Serbia, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Zimbabwe, 
Kosovo, and Somaliland
$6.9 increase
Decrease of more than 
$10 million
Chad, Colombia, Iraq, and Syria $172.4 million decrease
Decrease between $10 
and $1 million
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and 
Western Sahara
$8.8 million decrease
Decrease of less than $1 
million
CAR, Georgia, Mali, Senegal, and 
Solomon Islands 
$3.3 decrease
Recipients from 2017 
that did not receive new 
support in 2018
Azerbaijan and Mozambique $0.6 million received in 2017
New recipients in 2018 Benin, Guinea-Bissau, 
Montenegro, Nigeria, Marshall 
Islands, Tunisia, and Turkey
$1.7 million received in 2018
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR
In 2018, 62% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while 
support to victim assistance represented 7% of the total international support to mine action. 
“Various” funding represented 28% of all international support to mine action. This 
includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked 
for any sectors.
Clearance and risk education
In 2018, $396.9 million, or 62% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance 
and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of $7.4 million from 2017.
Four of the 10 largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, and Norway—provided three-
quarters of all support to clearance and risk education ($293.5 million). 
Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-one 
donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a 
total of $123.1 million in 29 countries and two other areas.12
12 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Palau, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Signatory that received international assistance 
for clearance was: the Marshall Islands. States not party that received international assistance for 
clearance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received 














Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $9.3 million specifically for risk education 
projects in 16 countries.13 Syria received the most risk education-specific funding with $2.7 
million. 









% of total 
dedicated 
contribution
Clearance and risk 
education
396.9 62% 26 93%
Various 182.6 28% 23 N/A
Victim assistance 44.7 7% 16 4%
Capacity-building 14.0 2% 15 2%
Advocacy 4.4 1% 13 1%
Stockpile destruction 0 0% 0 0%
Total 642.6 100% N/A
Note: N/A = not applicable. “Dedicated contribution” (non-various funding) totaled $460million in 
2018 and included funding set for a specific sector (advocacy, capacity-building, clearance, risk edu-
cation, stockpile destruction, or victim assistance). The “0” in stockpile destruction in 2018 does not 
mean states expended no funds for that activity, but rather that none of the contributions reported in 
2018 detailed dedicated stockpile destruction funding.
Victim assistance
Based on information available as of October 2019, direct international support for victim 
assistance activities in 2018 totaled $44.7 million, up from $27.7 million in 2017, and 
represented 7% of all reported support for mine action. While this represents an increase of 
$17 million (up 61%) compared to 2017, as a proportion of all international support provided 
this remains within the 4–7% range observed since 2013. 
Sixteen15 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 12 States 
Parties, and five states not party.16 Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct 
international support for victim assistance. The 2018 increase was the result of higher 
contributions from donors to victim assistance activities within the context of emergency 
operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. However, there 
was a continuous and sharp decline in victim assistance support provided for most of the 
other affected countries where needs remain great and available resources are lacking, 
with nine out of the 17 recipients receiving less support in 2018 compared to 2017 (for a 
combined decrease totaling $11million).
The top three victim assistance donors—the US, Germany, and New Zealand—provided 
70% ($31.2 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2018. 
13 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: CAR, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.
14 In 2017, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education 
($404.3 million, or 58% of total international support), victim assistance ($27.7 million, or 4%), capacity-
building ($11.2 million, or 2%), advocacy ($3.6 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%), 
and various activities ($249.5 million, or 35%). Data for 2017 was revised—based on new figures that 
detailed dedicated clearance, risk education, and victim assistance funding, as well as contributions that 
were not previously reported by donors. 
15 Victim assistance donors included: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, EU, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.
16 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, 
Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that 
received international assistance for victim assistance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, and Syria.
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In 2018, nearly half of all victim assistance support (48%) went to just four countries—
Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria—receiving a combined total of $21.7 million. Thirty 
percent was provided to global activities (without a designated recipient state or area), and 
the remaining 22% went to victim assistance activities in 13 other countries. 
Funding for victim assistance activities remains especially difficult to track because 
many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs 
for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities, or are not able to provide 
specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding. Since such contributions are not 
disaggregated, it is not possible to include them in Monitor reporting. However, this annual 
estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding 
situation. 
Advocacy and capacity-building
In 2018, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities 
($4.4 million).17 Of the 33 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 13 
reported supporting advocacy activities.
Fifteen donors collectively provided $14 million—1% of all international support—to 
support capacity-building activities in 15 countries.18
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
IN 2018
Overall national contributions to mine action continue 
to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national 
funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States Parties 
such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as well as states not party India 
and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant 
contamination and major clearance operations, usually 
conducted by the army—have never reported annual 
expenditures. 
Eight affected states reported $56.9 million in 
contributions to mine action from their national budget 
in 2018, $41.4 million less than the $98.3 million 
reported in 2017, and far from the $131.2 million 
reported in 2015.
FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION  
2014–2018
Over the past five years (2014–2018), total support to mine action amounted to $3.2 billion, 
an average of about $639 million per year. 
Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted 
for about 18% of total mine action funding over the period and amounted to approximately 
$565 million. 
17 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, contributions to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP), the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
18 Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Palestine, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 

























International support totaled $2.6 billion, an average of $525 million per year, and 
represented 82% of all support. Three donors—the US ($947.1 million), the EU ($361.8 
million), and Japan ($208.8 million)—contributed $1.5 billion, nearly half of total international 
support. Four other donors—Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK—contributed 
more than $100 million each. 
Between 2014 and 2018, there were notable variations in allocations of international 
support:
  Dedicated clearance and risk education funding increased by 40%: rising from 
$283.5 million in 2014 to nearly $397 million in 2018. Over the period, more than 
three-fifths of international support went to clearance and risk education activities 
(64%, or $1.8 billion). 
  The volume of victim assistance funding totaled $139.1 million and has grown 
from $26.5 million in 2014 to $44.7 million in 2018 (an increase of 6%). However, 
support to victim assistance accounted for just 5% of all international support over 
the period. 
  “Various” funding increased by about $110 million (150%) from $73 million to 
$182.6 million. In 2014, unearmarked and not disaggregated funding represented 
just 17% of all international support, compared to 35% in 2017 and 28% in 2018.
  Capacity-building remained more or less at the same level during the period with an 
average annual contribution of $11.6 million.
  International support to advocacy activities dropped significantly from $30.7 million 
in 2014 to $2.2 million in 2015 (a 93% decrease) and has remained below $5 million 
since. 
  Donors did not report any new dedicated stockpile destruction funding since 2016.
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Humanity & Inclusion mine clearance operation in Laos. The deminer is equipped with 

















STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION
1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION  
(1997 MINE BAN TREATY)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into 
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second 
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign; 
rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as 
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has 
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 1 November 2019 there were 164 States Parties.  
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97;  
  3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
98 
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Dem Rep of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia, North 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00 















Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 
   1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
SIGNATORY





































CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated 
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the 
world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, 
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important 
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the 
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced 
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end 
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around 
the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally 
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, 
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all 
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 















Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on 
the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1.  Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly 
or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party under this Convention.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1.  “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel 
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2.  “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a 
vehicle.
3.  “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, 
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4.  “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into 
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not 
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.




1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a 
number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine 
clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not 
exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
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ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its 
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall 
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein 
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit 
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of 
all the anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; 
and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration 
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
















International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek 
and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose 
undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes.
3.   Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, 
international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International 
Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance 
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with 
demining. 
5.  Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of 
stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6.  Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various 
means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7.  States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties 
or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in 
the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementa-
tion of the program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant 
governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall 





1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon 
as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot 
numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 
contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail 
as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each 
mined area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained 
or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or 
mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the 
institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in ac-
cordance with Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 
production facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the 
location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force 
of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type 
of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along 
with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruc-
tion in accordance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the 
extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where 
reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and 
clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the 
dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other 
information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in 
relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States 
Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to 
the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of 
















2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter 
to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. 
Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken 
to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, 
to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her 
good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal 
and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a 
request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for 
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such 
communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States 
Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of 
States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case 
may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by 
consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this 
decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including 
any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a 
majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a 
mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places 
directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the 
requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties 
and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded 
as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance 
in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding 
missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
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State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to 
such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of 
the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with 
the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be 
appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges 
and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the 
territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party 
shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the 
mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum 
extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding 
mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment 
which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. 
Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it 
intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission 
is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas 
and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be 
expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State 
Party considers necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have 
with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no 
more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-
finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the 
results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider 
all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a 
specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response 
to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may 
suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the 
matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity 
with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, 















20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, 
otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9
National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including 
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 




1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State 
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by 
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the 
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and 
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent 
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to 




1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be 
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States 
Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five 
years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Par-
ties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of 
this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated 
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a 
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an 
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held 
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of 
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall 
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this 
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments 
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any 

















1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States 
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the 
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature 
at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. 
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month 
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been 
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that 








1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw 
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the 
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument 
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect 
before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the 








The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

